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Introduction  
Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is.  
(Phenomenology, Page 118, Par.195)  
 
In his Discourse on Method Descartes compares philosophical method to building a 
house. For him, it is important to begin philosophical inquiry anew; he tries “to try to reform my 
own thoughts and to build upon a foundation which is completely my own.”1 Like building a 
new house, the first step is to completely remove the foundations of the old house and replace it 
with something stronger and sturdier that can support grander structures. This is especially 
important for philosophy since, as Descartes says, the principles of other sciences “must all be 
borrowed from philosophy;”2 the foundations of philosophy cannot be put together carelessly if 
it is to be the foundation of all knowledge. The task of philosophy is to provide a method of 
reasoning that is both simple and rigorous, a method that will develop the capacity for reasoning 
to its fullest extent. To successfully employ the Cartesian method is to be cautious and wary of 
things we take for granted. 
The first was never to accept anything as true that I did not know evidently 
to be so; that is, carefully to avoid precipitous judgment and prejudice; 
and to include nothing more in my judgments than what presented itself to 
my mind with such clarity and distinctness that I would have no occasion 
to put it in doubt.3  
Hence, the problem that Descartes sees not just in philosophy but for all human beings 
who have the capacity for reasoning is that we readily accept opinions and ready-made 
judgements as truths without making the effort to examine their foundations. Old methods of 
reasoning are to be replaced by a new method that is free from defects: the Cartesian method 
assumes that error derives from what came before; the solution is to find something new. 
                                                            
1 Descartes, R. and Cress, D. A. (1993) Discourse on method ; and, meditations on first philosophy. 3rd edn. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 9. 
2 Ibid, 13. 
3 Ibid, 11. 
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Although Descartes recognizes that universal doubt could lead to madness—he accepts that 
social life depends on traditions, the laws of the land, and the wisdom of the past—philosophy 
depends on freeing oneself from their influence. “I learned to believe nothing very firmly 
concerning what I had been persuaded to believe only by example and custom; and thus 
gradually freed myself from many errors that can darken our natural light and render us less able 
to listen to reason”4. Thus the philosopher stands outside the confines and limitations of his 
experience and exercises reason to arrive at truth.  
The philosophers who are central to this paper—Marx, Hegel, Buddha and Laozi—see 
things very differently from Descartes. For these thinkers, Cartesian abstraction is an 
impossibility. Where Descartes imagines we can abstract ourselves from the influence of the past 
and external circumstances, they understand that philosophy begins with the recognition that we 
are conditioned beings.  The problem for philosophical inquiry is not so much that people fail to 
think for themselves and thus to escape the influence of their circumstances. The problem, for 
these thinkers, is that people tend to forget that they are part of a larger picture of 
interconnections and mutual interactions. As Marx puts it in Grundrisse, “The more deeply we 
go back into history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, 
appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole.”5 That dependency is not merely social in 
the sense that individuals just happen to live and interact with one another. Descartes' abstraction 
from his social and material existence—“I could freely undertake to rid myself of them”6—is 
misguided. Understanding dependency correctly is to see it is a process of mutual conditioning, 
struggle, and transformation involving all parts of the whole. Hence Marx's sardonic jibe, “The 
                                                            
4 Ibid, 6. 
5 Marx, K. and Nicolaus, M. (1973) Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy. New York: New 
York, Vintage Books [1973], 84. 
6 Descartes, Discourse on Method, 16. 
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whole profundity of those modern economists…lies in this forgetting.”7 For both Marx and 
Hegel the fundamental predicament of consciousness is to forget that it is conditioned and 
dependent. “The consciousness which is this truth has this path behind it and has forgotten 
it…merely asserts that it is all reality, but does not itself comprehend this.”8 This arrogance and 
false consciousness keep philosophers from arriving at the truth.  
Eastern philosophers like Laozi also reveal the interconnectedness of all things. 
The great Tao floods over,  
To the left, to the right. 
Ten thousand beings live by it, 
And it does not reject them.9 
 
 He also warns about the dangers of forgetting this interconnectedness between 
individuals with each other, with nature, and with the greater whole. 
Not knowing the Everlasting 
One commits evils wantonly.10  
 
 If the problem for philosophical inquiry is not improper reasoning but the tendency to 
forget, then the task of philosophers is not merely to propound methods and systems. The role of 
the philosopher is not to lead individuals down an unfamiliar path that will get them to the final 
destination that is truth. Instead, the task of the philosopher is precisely to help individuals recall 
the path that they are already walking on, “Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the 
recollection of the Spirits as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the organization of 
their realm.”11 In other words, philosophers help individuals to cultivate their historical or 
dialectical consciousness. It is not the case that truth stands outside reason but reason already 
                                                            
7 Marx, Grundrisse, 85. 
8 Hegel, G. W. F., Miller, A. V. and Findlay, J. N. (1979) Phenomenology of Spirit (Galaxy Books). 1st edn. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, USA, 141. 
9 Chen, E. M., zi, L., Tzu, L., Lao‐Tzu, E. C. M., Laozi, L. Z. and Laozi (1989) The Tao Te Ching: A New Translation With 
Commentary. 1st edn. New York: Paragon House Publishers. 
10 Chen, Tao Te Ching, 94. 
11 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 493. 
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stands within truth. Framing philosophical inquiry as a process of remembrance might make the 
task seem an easy one. Historical consciousness would entail recalling the past like remembering 
yesterday’s weather. But this would be too easy; not merely a mental action is required, but an 
act of self-abnegation. Historical consciousness can only arise from the recognition that 
individuals are conditioned and dependent. The acknowledgement of dependency is contrary to 
the desire of the self to be all reality, “an existence on its own and a separate freedom.”12 Our 
reality is a shared reality, the sphere of life where “the passive separatedness of the 
shapes…collapse into one another.”13 Hegel calls the path towards historical consciousness a 
path of despair. It is despair not because individuality is lost; dependency or conditionality does 
not mean that everything is reduced to homogeneity without identity. It is not to say abstractly 
that the world is the same as me and I am the same as the world. What it does mean is that 
individuals are in constant relationship with one another. Those interactions are not always 
positive; they can also be negative in the sense that they contradict what individuals want and 
desire. But, since individuals are dependent and conditioned beings, the solution is not finding a 
mean to escape; there is no escape. Rather, it is a confrontation without “turning away and 
pass(ing) on to something else.”14 
It is this power, not as something positive, which closes its eyes to the 
negative…on the contrary, Spirit is this power only by looking the 
negative in the face, and tarrying with it15 
 While the recognition of dependence might seem like a rejection of individuality, it 
actually leads to a better understanding of individuality in comparison to the crude individualism 
that came before historical consciousness. “It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it 
                                                            
12 Ibid, 19. 
13 Ibid, 108. 
14 Ibid, 19. 
15 Ibid, 19.  
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finds itself.”16 The effort of an individual striving towards historical consciousness is not merely 
the use of mental energy to recall the past; it demands the courage to see the neglected truth that 
was already there. It takes more than just wit and intelligence. It takes work. This work is the 
subject of this paper.  
No one doubts the importance of work in daily life. Work is basic to our perceptions of the 
world, especially these days. A worker is described as “making a living”— work is a livelihood, a 
place on the job market, “He works in order to live.”17 Whatever one's opinions about justice and 
other ideals, work, understood as wage labor, is an inevitable part of life. For most students, 
prospects of work guide their choice of studies. However unexamined, work may be the most 
important concept for us. It gives meaning to otherwise aimless activities and provides structure 
to our lives.   If work already holds such a great importance for us and society as a whole, then 
why does it require philosophical discussion? Because the understanding of work in 
contemporary society is poles apart from the understanding of work developed above. Wage labor 
differs from the work of historical consciousness.  
Hegel's famous aphorism holds that owl of Minerva takes flight at dusk. Philosophy 
engages with what is already being lost. When philosophers speak of the things that are dear to 
them, it means that those things are no longer dear to others. The concept of work, as developed 
by Hegel, Marx, Buddha, and Laozi seems in danger of eclipse.  It may be argued that work is 
dead, and that its corpse is on display. Politicians talk about making jobs and raising employment. 
People crave a career as though that were the path to a working life, not understanding that we 
have access to work at every moment. The purpose of this paper is not to fetishize work, but to 
develop a coherent understanding as the basis for a lifetime of work. At least this may keep us 
                                                            
16 Ibid, 19. 
17  Tucker, R. C. (1978) Tucker Marx‐Engels reader 2ed (cloth). 2nd edn. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 204.  
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from imagining that we are working when we are not. As Hegel says, there are ways “of creating 
an impression of hard work and serious commitment to the problem, while actually sparing 
oneself both.”18  
Since the emergence of work as wage labor is a defining characteristic of capitalism, the 
analysis of capitalism will be central to this paper. For Marx capitalism represents a sphere of 
non-historical consciousness. As formulated by classical economists such as Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo, capitalism is a force of progress that operates by its own laws and leads, as 
Fukuyama puts it, to the end of history, which amounts to the perpetuation of political economy; 
nothing comes after capitalism.  This corresponds to what Hegel calls the bad infinity, an infinite 
repetition of the same.  
In Marx's terms, capitalism is simply a society of individuals devoid of historical 
consciousness, hence it is a system of relations. For Marx most “economists are misled by the 
fetishism attached to the world of commodities.”19 They imagine capitalism as a system for the 
production of commodities, without analyzing the system of relations intrinsic in the commodity 
form. They imagine a world of things endowed with a kind of mystical power and obeying their 
own laws; the task of the modern economist becomes examination of these laws. The result is a 
mystification of capitalism.  
Talk of work as the effort towards historical consciousness, as the acknowledgment of 
dependency, might lead to a self-defeating attitude—individuals might appear helpless under the 
weight of their conditions. But dependency goes both ways. Our conditions change in 
accordance with how we live and behave. The most famous of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach 
holds that “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to 
                                                            
18 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 2. 
19 Marx, K., Mandel, E. and Fowkes, B. (1990) Capital: A critique of political economy: V. 1: A critique of political 
economy. New York, NY: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review., 176.  
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change it.”20 Many have taken this quote to heart, but perhaps it has been misunderstood. As 
Marx stated in his essay on Estranged Labour, “The only wheels which political economy sets in 
motion are greed, and the war amongst the greedy – competition.” If we see the world as a 
battlefield between people it is because people are overcome by greed. We forget that the state of 
the world depends on the state of individuals. The world is not a figment of our consciousness, 
but it does a faithfully reflect it. If we immerse ourselves in changing our surroundings, we might 
ignore the root of the problem, and the old patterns will repeat themselves.  
Therefore, yes, the point is to change the world. However, to change the world is to 
change ourselves. Through self-mastery we may achieve a higher level of self-consciousness; 
that is the ultimate goal of work. This work at first seems like an upward motion: we start out 
empty-handed and expect to get something, like a mysterious hidden prize, at the end of the road. 
But through this work we discover ourselves. As Hegel puts it, the movement of the journey is 
“something that recollects itself, whose existence is self-knowledge, and whose self-knowledge 
is just as immediately existence.”21 
Work must be understood concretely and not just abstractly. If we take the notion of work 
away from the sensible manner in which we imagine it—the image of the farmer toiling the field, 
the mechanic fixing machines, the sculptor chiseling his masterpiece— then we fail to see that 
work is only comprehensible when situated within a certain space and time, as part of history. As 
Marx says, when dealing with work, “we are dealing with a specific epoch e.g. modern 
bourgeois production,”22 with its own themes and characteristics. The broader our conception of 
work, the more we risk abstracting from its historical form. Each form of work, whether of the 
                                                            
20 Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1986) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected works: [their essential thinking in 
philosophy, political economy, history, social change and communism]. New York: International Publishers Co. 
21 Ibid, 28. 
22 Marx, Grundrisse, 85. 
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farmer, mechanic, or television personality, is a product of specific period of history, and each 
worker at each moment of history participates in the greater whole in different ways. A farmer 
today has a very different place in the world than farmers did in antiquity or even a hundred 
years ago. Where the capitalist system sees wage labor as interchangeable, for individuals each 
person’s work is different from everyone else's. If we understand work as a struggle, then every 
struggle is different and can only be understood by an individual in a specific situation. In other 
words, only I can comprehend my own situation and understand what I must do. No one else can 
do my work; one is “not to give oneself over the thoughts of others, upon mere authority, but to 
examine everything for oneself and follow one’s own conviction.”23 This is not a call for 
arbitrary freedom, but a reminder that one must take responsibility for oneself even within a 
larger group.  
Neither should we look at work as separate and unrelated physical activities. To do so 
would be to overlook that “There are characteristics which all stages of production have in have 
in common.”24 The productive forces in history are always in movement. To see work as a 
general principle is to recognize in work the common ground that ties different historical periods 
together; it is to see work not merely as an activity but as integral to the development of history 
and consciousness. Work is not just an activity amongst other activities. Work is an important 
component not only for understanding reality; “work forms and shapes the thing.”25 In other 
words, work is the actualization of reality.  
Thus work is first of all a principle of actualization. The formation of cultures, 
nationalities, etc. are themselves products of historical circumstances, outcomes of work. 
Secondly, work is the principle that allows for the transitions between different phases of history 
                                                            
23 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 19.   
24 Marx, Grundrisse, 88.  
25 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 118.   
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or consciousness.  The moment of work is a moment of disruption. “Work… is desire held in 
check, fleetingness staved off.”26 Hence, work is a synthesis of an aspiration for change and the 
actualization of that aspiration.  
We are still left with the question, how to work? In contemporary society, the worker's 
predicament seems hopeless:  
Workers do not produce themselves, they produce a power independent of 
themselves….As their alienated products accumulate, all time and space 
become foreign to them.27 
When this level of awareness is reached, typical reactions are agitation or desperation. In 
agitation one feels like one must do something, otherwise everything is wasted. Desperation 
whispers that one cannot do anything. One experiences “the feeling of profound dejection as well 
as of extreme rebellion.”28 One feels wronged by an overpowering external force. Threatened, 
the next step is to seek out the source of one's problem and annihilate it—a militant reaction. 
Capitalism is the enemy.  
Such militancy risks reifying capitalism as an eternal and unchanging socioeconomic 
relation, as political economy does; it might overlook that capitalism itself is a contradiction in 
movement. Marxism demanded that workers rise and overthrow the established power in order to 
reclaim the means of production; controlling the means of production, the workers could now 
work free from the domination of the bourgeoisie. In so doing, the revolutionaries impute to 
capitalism more power that it actually has. They would avoid commodity fetishism by fetishizing 
their enemy. When we identify ourselves as exploited, we risk further exploitation at our own 
hands. We might suffocate from our own hands around our throats. For the work of 
                                                            
26 Ibid, 118.  
27 Debord, G. (2013) The Society of the Spectacle. Edited by Ken Knabb. United States: Bureau of Public Secrets,U.S, 
11. 
28 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 314.  
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consciousness is always possible. Nothing prevents us from work. As Debord argues, it is 
characteristic of our contemporary society of the spectacle that we have removed ourselves from 
work. 
Due to the very success of this separate production of separation, the 
fundamental experience that in earlier societies was associated with 
people’s primary work is in the process of being replaced (in sectors near 
the cutting edge of the system’s evolution) by an identification of life with 
nonworking.29  
For Debord, the opposite of the spectacle is dialogue. What is needed at the moment is 
not another revolution fueled by agitation and desperation, but an openness to dialogue. But 
genuine dialogue is only possible when one is conscious of oneself, one's behavior and 
intentions. This, I argue in this paper, is what Hegel and philosophers like him considered work. 
Even though it sounds intimidating, it is simply a process of being honest and coming to terms 
with oneself.  
Study of Eastern philosophy can help in this endeavor, for Eastern traditions have 
cultivated the practice of self-reflection is a manner that is not necessarily analytical but 
primarily spiritual [geistig].  
What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is 
— this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent 
self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and 
independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’.30  
It offers a perspective of totality—not looking at ourselves in parts, like a biologist 
examining a specimen. Daoist and Buddhist sources see work as non-action; work is something 
that should not and cannot be rushed. Patience is required to prepare for the right time when one 
can make a difference.  
Therefore the sage says: 
I do not act; 
                                                            
29 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, Section 27. 
30 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 110.  
  14
Hence the people transform by themselves;31 
 
Or, in Debord's words: 
By rushing into sordid reformist compromises or pseudo-revolutionary 
collective actions, those driven by abstract desire for immediate 
effectiveness are in reality obeying the ruling laws of thought, adopting a 
perspective that can see nothing but the latest news…A critique seeking to 
go beyond the spectacle must know how to wait.32 
To recognize that we already possess the answers to our problems, if we are ready to 
work towards them, would already be a step towards change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
31 Chen, Tao Te Ching, 190.  
32 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, Section 220.  
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Chapter 1: The Lesson of Dependency 
 
Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another. 
(Phenomenology, Page 111, Par. 178) 
 
 
The Buddha's enlightenment under the bodhi tree is described as the revelation of 
dependent origination—the mutual causation of all things.  
At that time the Lord sat cross-legged for seven days experiencing the 
bliss of liberation. Then, at the end of those seven days, the Lord emerged 
from that concentration and gave well-reasoned attention during the first 
watch of the night to dependent arising in forward order, thus: 
 
This being, that is; 
from the arising of this, that arises.33 
 Then Ananda, the Buddha’s personal attendant, exclaims that he now understands 
dependent origination completely: 
It is wonderful, Lord, it is marvelous how profound this dependent 
origination is, and how profound it appears! And yet it appears to me as 
clear as clear!34 
The Buddha quickly rebukes him: 
Do not say that, Ananda, do not say that! This dependent origination is 
profound and appears profound. It is through not understanding, not 
penetrating this doctrine that this generation has become like a tangled 
ball of string, covered as with a blight, tangled like coarse grass, unable to 
pass beyond states of woe, the ill destiny, ruin and round of birth-and-
death.35 
The truth of dependent origination is simple in its formulation of “This being, that is.” 
We can also find another teaching in the same vein as dependent origination in the Tao Te Ching. 
When all under heaven know beauty as beauty, 
There is then ugliness; 
                                                            
33 “Bodhi Sutta: The Bodhi Tree (1)" (Ud 1.1), translated from the Pali by John D. Ireland. Access to Insight (Legacy 
Edition), 8 July 2010, http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.1.01.irel.html . 
34 Walshe, M. (1995) The long discourses of the Buddha: A translation of the Digha Nikaya (teachings of the 
Buddha). 2nd edn. Boston: Wisdom Publications,U.S., 223. 
35 Ibid, 223.  
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When all know the good (as) good; 
There is then the not good. 
 
Therefore being and non-being, give rise to each other, 
The difficult and easy complement each other, 
The long and short shape each other, 
The high and low lean on each other, 
Voices and instruments harmonize with one another, 
The front and rear follow upon one another.36 
  
The simplicity of appearances is deceiving; what appears may seem easy to understand, 
but only because our consciousness tends to simplify reality. Though we may think we 
understand the concept of dependent origination—the interrelation of all things—we still tend to 
see things as separate entities. Reality appears to us as a series of events, one following the other. 
We often see the whole of reality as continuous like a long chain and its parts as smaller links 
that connect with one another. Yet, we suppose that if we were to remove one of the links from 
this long chain, the link could exist on its own apart from the chain and the chain would continue 
to exist even with one of the links missing. The chain and the links, the whole and its parts 
appear as two separate entities with inherent and independent existences.  
Marx sees his contemporaries, the political economists, making the same mistake by 
imagining the relationship between individuals and society as mutually independent, which 
amounts to “the re-establishing of “Society” as an abstraction vis-à-vis the individual.”37 The 
political economists imagine society as something separate from the life of the individual. The 
political economists have in their possession a comprehensive system of society, of “capital and 
land, and of wages, profit of capital and rent of land—likewise division of labor, competition, the 
                                                            
36 Chen, Tao Te Ching, 55. 
37 Tucker, Marx‐Engels Reader, “Estranged Labour”, 86.  
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concept of exchange-value, etc.,”38 from which they deduce a system of laws. This vision of 
political economy as something autonomous corresponds to a vision of the autonomous 
individual. They cannot let go of the fantasy of Robin Crusoe, “The individual and isolated 
hunter and fisherman" and the dream of "a return to a misunderstood natural life.”39 In reply, 
Marx goes so far as to say that to imagine individuals as separate from society “is as much of an 
absurdity as is the development of language without individuals living together and talking to 
each other.”40  
Just as the Buddha cautions that it is hard to grasp the truth of dependent origination, so 
Debord warns against imagining the independence of things. This process “which seems at first 
glance so trivial and obvious… is actually so complex and full of metaphysical subtleties.”41 It 
might seem harmless to hold the view that things exist independently, but that is the heart of the 
problem. “Whenever representation becomes independent, the spectacle regenerates itself.”42 
This autonomy of representation is deeply rooted in the western tradition. "The spectacle inherits 
the weakness of the Western philosophical project, which attempted to understand activity by 
means of the categories of vision, and it is based on the relentless development of the particular 
technical rationality that grew out of that form of thought."43 
To hold the view that objects (things and people) are inherently independent is not merely 
to commodify the whole of our experience, a tendency specific to capitalism. It implies an 
ancient and deep-seated tendency to distort reality. In other words, to see all representations as 
independent rather than dependent is a trait exemplified by but long predating capitalism. "The 
                                                            
38 Ibid, 70.  
39 Marx, The Grundrisse, 83. 
40 Ibid, 84.  
41 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, Section 35.  
42 Ibid, 6.  
43 Ibid, 6. 
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root of the spectacle is that oldest of all social specializations, the specialization of power. The 
spectacle plays the specialized role of speaking in the name of all the other activities. It is 
hierarchical society’s ambassador to itself, delivering its messages at a court where no one else is 
allowed to speak. The most modern aspect of the spectacle is thus also the most archaic."44 
Thus the view of political economy that individuals and things exist independently from 
one another is not only motivated by theoretical reasons, or merely by the wish to give a 
descriptive account of reality. It is not just the political economists who cling to the image of 
Robinson Crusoe. We, as individuals, implicitly long for the same existence. We want to be 
independent and free from unwanted influences. We are driven by desire. “We desire to observe 
the manifestations.”45 In other words, as individuals we desire to see things as separate and 
independent, reflecting our own desire for absolute individuality. As Hegel says in the 
Phenomenology, “Self-consciousness which is simply for itself…, or is primarily desire, will… 
learn through experience that the object is independent.”46   
Where does this desire come from?  First, there is a desire for independence because 
consciousness learns from experience that it is different from the objects within its environment. 
In the process of interacting with things, the individual realizes that there is something distinctive 
about the object: “it is a being that is reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is a 
living thing.”47  
Second, consciousness reflects this realization back on itself. It becomes self-
consciousness. Consciousness learns that, since what gives the object existence is its 
independence, to have existence is precisely to be independent. Without this independence, 
                                                            
44 Ibid, 7. 
45 Chen, Tao Te Ching, 51.  
46 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 106.  
47 Ibid, 106.  
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consciousness thinks that it will be at risk of being “dissolved in this universal element”48 or 
becoming a thing amongst things. In response, consciousness “preserves itself by separating 
itself”49 from objects, creating a division between it and things. This independent existence is 
what consciousness deems the self: “Opposed to an other, the ‘I’ is its own self.”50 Division or 
separation is the origin of individuality; “this dividedness of the differenceless fluid medium is 
just what establishes individuality.”51 This eventually leads to a developed sense of self and in 
that way consciousness becomes self-consciousness.  
There being 'I am,' there comes to be 'I am here,' there comes to be 'I am 
like this' ... 'I am otherwise' ... 'I am bad' ... 'I am good' ... 'I might be' ... 'I 
might be here' ... 'I might be like this' ... 'I might be otherwise' ... 'May I be' 
... 'May I be here' ... 'May I be like this' ... 'May I be otherwise' ... 'I will be' 
... 'I will be here' ... 'I will be like this' ... 'I will be otherwise.'52              
 This separation extends beyond the relation between individuals and things to the relation 
between individuals and individuals. The individual sees himself and the other as separate. “If a 
man is confronted... he is confronted by the other man”53 who is seen as an image that is 
“equally independent and self-contained, and there is nothing in it of which it is not itself the 
origin.”54 When both sides are established as independent from one another, whether as 
individuals and things or as individuals and individuals, the relation is alienating. Not only are 
things and other individuals external to the person himself but, collectively, they become "a 
power of its own confronting him... as something hostile and alien.”55 A thing with no 
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independent power now “operates on him as an alien, divine, or diabolical activity;”56 other 
people are now his masters and his enemies. This reinforces the existing alienation. In Marxian 
terms, “The relationship of the worker to labor engenders the relation to it of the capitalist, or 
whatever one chooses to call the master of labor.”57 This notion of absolute individuality and 
independence, instead of providing consciousness with confidence and assurance, actually casts 
consciousness towards “the pathway of doubt, or more precisely... the way of despair.”58   
By making itself as inherently real and independent as the absolute individual, “the 
beyond is established for consciousness.”59  The other is felt as outside the grasp of self-
consciousness and it “feels this violence and anxiety.”60 Τhis anxiety, caused by the belief that 
one is inherently independent, as alienation, is the cause of desire. Desire can only occur if there 
is division or separation and it manifests as “the supersession of all distinctions.”61 Because 
things and others are determined as independent apart from the self, the only way that one 
interacts with them is through desire; therefore, “self-consciousness is Desire in general.”62 Self-
consciousness creates a division between itself, as a self, and everything else, including other 
people—this alienation can only be compensated by desire. Desire must emerge, so that it 
“overarches this other.”63 Desire and alienation go hand in hand; they cannot be separated. So 
when interacting with something or someone, self-consciousness cannot just relate to the object 
in an ordinary manner. Self-consciousness must take hold of the object. “When consciousness 
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feels this violence, its anxiety may well make it retreat from the truth, and strive to hold on to 
what it is in danger of losing.”64 The Buddha also speaks about the inclination to desire.  
And what, bhikkhus, are the things that can be clung to, and what is 
clinging? Form, bhikkhus, is a thing that can be clung to, the desire and 
lust for it is the clinging there. Feeling...Perception...Volitional 
formations...Consciousness is a thing that can be clung to; the desire and 
lust for it is the clinging there. These are called the things that can be clung 
to, and this the clinging. 65 
What happens when one desires? The first moment of desire is transgression. 
Consciousness, by its nature, wants to overcome its alienation. By its identification with desire, 
consciousness tries to overcome alienation by overstepping its bounds and the other’s bounds 
through acts of subjegation or domination. This appears in the Phenomenology as the struggle of 
the lord and the bondsman: “he [the lord]...is the power over the other [the bondsman], it follows 
that he holds the other in subjection.”66 It is the power and the desire of the lord to negate, 
subdue, and ultimately to hate others.  
We might compare the story in the Digha Nikaya of a prince who kills his father in order 
to claim kingship.  
Transgression overcame me, Lord, foolish, erring and wicked as I was, in 
that for the throne deprived my father, that good man and just king, of his 
life. 67 
 These are extreme examples, but transgression happens in every moment of our lives. It 
occurs even in an ordinary activity like eating.  
At Savatthi. Now on that occasion King Pasenadi of Kosala had eaten a 
bucket measure of rice and curries. Then, while still full, huffing and 
puffing, the king approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him and, 
and sat down to one side.  
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Then the Blessed One, having understood that King Pasenadi was full 
and was huffing and puffing, on that occasion recited this verse: 
 
“When a man is always mindful, 
Knowing moderation in the food he eats, 
His ailments then diminish: 
He ages slowly, guarding his life.”68 
 
 When determining if natural consciousness is transgressing, it is important not to base our 
judgments solely on a specific example of transgression. Rather, we have to look at the relation 
between consciousness and its objects. Then certain subtleties become apparent. Even though 
killing and eating are two different activities, they both can represent moments of transgression 
for consciousness. In the act of killing, in relation to his father, the consciousness of the prince 
knows nothing else but the negation of the object which is the king. The same goes for the 
person who overeats. His mind is totally engrossed in the moment of consumption and knows 
nothing but the desire to consume everything in sight. Transgression appears in endless numbers 
of ways and we cannot identity it by just looking at one specific instance (killing but not eating) 
and from one side (strictly objective or subjective). In any case, we always have to look at how 
they relate. Transgression manifests in every excessive action or behavior; it is also apparent in 
the lord’s fixated enjoyment of the bondsman’s work. “For the lord…the immediate relation 
becomes…the enjoyment of it.”69  
The second moment of desire is possession, “the sensuous appropriation for and by man 
of the human essence and human life…in the sense of possessing, of having.”70 Accumulation 
becomes the goal, consciousness must take ownership of the other. “When at the same time the 
                                                            
68 Bodhi, Samyutta Nikaya, 176.  
69 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 116.  
70 Tucker, Marx‐Engels Reader, “Private Property and Communism”, 87.  
  23
thing is taken up into my will, possession becomes ownership.”71 The point is to make the other 
mine. “Through possession, on the one hand, I come external; and, on the other hand (which 
amounts to the same thing), an external thing becomes mine.”72 This moment is the opposite of 
transgression, where consciousness tries to negate its opposite. With possession, consciousness 
tries to maintain its object as long as possible. In “Lordship and Bondage,” even though the lord, 
through a life-and-death struggle, dominates the bondsman, the lord “cannot go the length being 
altogether done with it (the bondsman) to the point of annihilation.”73 Formerly, consciousness 
wanted to master its object, but consciousness is now at its mercy. One moment consciousness 
was indulging to the point of excess. The next moment, when consciousness possesses, even the 
most basic activity such as consumption for the sake of sustenance is neglected, not to mention 
higher needs. “The less you eat, drink, and read books; the less you go to the theatre, the dance 
hall, the public-house…the more you save – the greater becomes your treasure which neither 
moths nor dust will devour – your capital.”74 Since consciousness refuses to consume or 
annihilate its objects, the tendency is to accumulate.  Greed takes over. “Private property has 
made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it – when it exists for 
us as capital, or when it is directly possessed.” 75  
The Tao Te Ching also speaks to our tendency for greed.  
Among offenses, none is greater than having what is desirable. 
Among calamities, none is greater than not knowing contentment. 
Among blame, none is greater than the desire for gain.76 
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Laozi warns about greed not only because greed is dangerous in and of itself but also because of 
where greed can lead us. Possession of the object of desire is dangerous: not only is there no 
room for contentment if our goal in life is to accumulate but, since it is a moment of the dialectic, 
it leads consciousness back to the previous moment of transgression—of needless negation and 
hate and also a return to alienation. For that reason, there is no end to possession and 
accumulation. The last moment of possession is only the beginning of a new cycle of alienation. 
In summary, alienation and desire and, within desire itself, transgression and possession, 
are at their peak and epitomized in self-consciousness. Alienation reaches its highest point when 
consciousness recognizes in the object or in another individual the characteristic of otherness and 
within itself the characteristic of selfhood. Since self, objects, and individuals are alienated from 
each other, desire is the way they connect to one another when alienation is at its highest point. 
When desire is at its highest point, the climax of transgression and possession also occurs. Self-
consciousness transgresses through the act of seeking “the death of the other.”77 
In the Buddhist context, this is hatred. When hatred is at its peak what we have is the 
desire to annihilate the other.  
The Blessed One said this: "Here, student, some man or woman kills living 
beings and is murderous, bloody-handed, given to blows and violence, 
merciless to living beings.78 
 And in the Tao Te Ching we have war.  
One who assists the ruler with Tao, 
Does not overpower the world by military conquests.79 
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With the desire for possession, self-consciousness wants to subjugate the other, not only 
owning the thing but owning the other as a bondsman or a slave, reducing the other 
consciousness to “the form of thinghood.”80  In Buddhism, there is greed: “covetousness and 
unrighteous greed is an imperfection that defiles the mind.”81 This corresponds to the comments 
from the Tao Te Ching on greed and accumulation cited above.  
Alienation, desire, transgression and possession are all components of political economy, 
but they can only be understood by understanding their origin. They all emerge from the view 
that things and individuals have inherent independent selves, separate from one another—the 
view that every single thing has autonomous being. “In the same way, any action performed with 
greed... performed with aversion... performed with delusion — born of delusion, caused by 
delusion, originating from delusion: wherever one's selfhood turns up, there that action will 
ripen.”82  
Nonetheless, if we further conceive the two moments of alienation and desire as 
independent and separate while having inherent existence, as though one could desire without 
being alienated and be alienated without desiring, then the result is that one moment contradicts 
the other. Such is the case for wage labor: when the wage laborer produces he is producing 
something outside himself. “The product of his activity is not the object of his activity,”83 since 
he works for money. The activity of labor is a moment of alienation. But the laborer "does not 
even reckon labor as part of his life.”84 His life begins when laboring ends: “life begins for him 
                                                            
80 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 115.  
81 Pali, Majjhima Nikaya, 118. 
82 "Nidana Sutta: Causes" (AN 3.33), translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. Access to Insight (Legacy 
Edition), 30 November 2013,http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an03/an03.033.than.html . 
83 Tucker, Marx‐Engels Reader, “Wage Labour and Capital”, 205.  
84 Ibid, 204.  
  26
where this activity ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed.”85 These places are the domain of 
the laborer’s desire. He imagines his life of alienated labor as separate from his desires; yet he 
engages in alienated labor only in order to gratify his desires. The laborer does not see this 
connection; neither does political economy. The division between the life of alienated labor and 
the life of isolated desire is so great that, as Marx says, “If the silk worm were to spin in order to 
continue its existence as a caterpillar, it would be a complete wage-worker.”86 
Since alienation and desire constitute the same movement, the contradiction between 
them is an internal contradiction. Hence the movement of political economy and the movement 
of desire always appear contradictory.  
The growing incompatibility between the productive development of society 
and its hitherto existing relations of production expresses itself in bitter 
contradictions, crises and spasms. The violent destruction of capital not by 
relations external to it, but rather as a condition of its self-preservation, is 
the most striking form in which advice is given it to be gone and to give 
room to a higher state of social production.87   
We run into contradictions at every turn. On the larger level of political economy, we 
have alienation and desire. Because of their different features, alienation (as the condition in 
which everything is divided), and desire (as the irresistible impulse to reunite distinctions), 
oppose each other. “The two Forces thus consist in their being determined as mutually 
opposed.”88 Since alienation and desire are the underlying motors of political economy, political 
economy exemplifies the contradiction between alienation and desire.  
On the one hand, political economy expresses the repulsion and irreconcilability of 
alienation. “The laws of political economy express the estrangement of the worker in his 
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object.”89 At the same time, political economy also shows that attempts to unify these differences 
by aligning and identifying with desire reduce every relation to capitalistic relations.  
We have already seen how the political economist establishes the unity of 
labor and capital in a variety of ways: — (1) Capital is accumulated labor. 
(2) The purpose of capital within production – partly, reproduction of 
capital with profit, partly, capital as raw material (material of labor), and 
partly, as itself a working instrument (the machine is capital directly 
equated with labor) – is productive labor. (3) The worker is a capital. (4) 
Wages belong to costs of capital. (5) In relation to the worker, labor is the 
reproduction of life-capital. (6) In relation to the capitalist, labor is an 
aspect of his capital’s activity.  
 
Finally, (7) the political economist postulates the original unity of capital 
and labor in the form of the unity of the capitalist and the worker; this is 
the original state of paradise.90 
In the end, we are all capitalists, “Society is then conceived as an abstract capitalist.”91 
Because political economy expresses both alienation and desire, it culminates in a contradiction: 
The more we desire or, in Marx’s term, the more value we seek, the more alienated we are.  
…the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more 
value he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes; the 
better formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the 
more civilized his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the 
mightier labor becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker; the more 
ingenious labor becomes, the duller becomes the worker. 92  
 
More importantly, not only political economy, as a set of laws and an expression of 
reality, contains within itself an internal contradiction. The desirous individuals who operate 
within the system of political economy are also in contradiction with themselves. The Buddha 
speaks of the contradiction within the individual as following.  
“Bhikkhus, these two extremes should not be followed by one who has gone 
forth into homelessness. What two? The pursuit of sensual happiness in 
sensual pleasures, which is low, vulgar, the way of wordlings, ignoble, 
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unbeneficial; and the pursuit of self-mortification, which is painful, 
ignoble, unbeneficial.”93  
 Transgression and possession appear contradictory and both of those moments reside 
within the individual who is craving or desiring. One spends extravagantly to the point of excess, 
supposing the life of gratification as fulfilling, as what gives meaning to one’s life.  
To fill the hall with gold and jade, 
There is no way to guard them. 
To be rich, exalted and proud, 
This is to invite blame upon oneself.94 
Yet, one pushes oneself to the point of deprivation and denies the most basic necessities 
for the sake of possession and accumulation. It is the path of “Self-denial, the denial of life and 
of all human needs.”95 The more one accumulates the more one loses and one is willing to lose in 
order to accumulate more. Contradiction occurs from the highest all the way down to the lowest 
stratum. 
However, as implied above, although alienation and desire are oppositional, they depend 
on each other: “division of labor and wealth of production, division of labor and accumulation of 
capital, are mutually interrelated.”96 The contradiction is, in actuality, a mutual conditioning, “As 
positive and negative they stimulate each other into activity.”97 Alienation and desire condition 
each other by the fact that each gives the other its existence—alienation exists with and because 
of desire, and vice versa. The same holds for the life of enjoyment and the life of thrift. One has 
to save and accumulate in order to enjoy, and enjoyment is what gives purpose to accumulation. 
People “forget that extravagance and thrift, luxury and privation, wealth and poverty are 
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equal.”98 Not only can one side not completely annihilate its opposite, but each side mutually 
keeps the other alive and is responsible for the other. Ultimately, alienation and desire are two 
moments of the same movement. They go hand in hand. Hegel uses the magnet as an example of 
this unity of movement that contains an internal contradiction: “the north pole which is in the in-
itself of the south pole is the north pole actually present in the same magnet.”99 The repulsive 
and attractive force exist in the magnet as alienation and desire in political economy and self-
consciousness. Alienation is pushing away, a repulsive force, “what is selfsame repels itself from 
itself.”100 Desire is pulling in, an attractive force, “what is not selfsame is self-attractive.”101 The 
same goes for transgression and possession, which are also just two moments constituting the 
movement that is desire. The former is the pushing aspect of the movement and the latter its 
pulling aspect, to use a bodily analogy.  
Seeing alienation and desire as mutually dependent moments helps us to reconsider our 
normal tendency to see the movement of reality or history as a sequence of inherently 
independent events and entities “vying with each other and constantly replacing each other,”102 
forming a linear movement. An understanding of mutual dependency and conditioning shows 
that the movement is circular. “You must hold on to the circular movement sensuously 
perceptible in that progression, by which man repeats himself.”103 That is not to say that every 
apparent repetition is identical to what comes before and after, since we cannot know exactly 
what came before and what might come after—we might lack necessary information. Historical 
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consciousness is not about retaining complete information about the past and making perfect 
predictions about the future.  
The Tao Te Ching warns against knowledge that is merely miscellaneous information: 
When intelligence and knowledge appear, 
There is great artificiality.104 
To understand historical consciousness as unrelated information about the past and future, 
without any bearing on our own lives, would be an artificial understanding of historical 
consciousness and history. History repeats itself through a dependent or dialectical movement; 
historical consciousness is the recognition of this movement. And with that understanding, at 
every stage, the individual is always in a position to learn the lesson of dependent origination and 
live accordingly.  
Therefore the sage embraces the One. 
He becomes the model of the world.105 
 The individual always has access to this awareness of history. “The entire so-called 
history of the world is nothing…but the coming-to-be of nature for man, he has the visible 
proof…through himself, of his process of coming-to-be.”106 Yet, that advantage could also be a 
disadvantage. What would otherwise bring “human emancipation and recovery”107 could instead 
be viewed, rightly so, as samsara, a vicious cycle of unending suffering and eternal bondage 
with no means of escape.  
At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, this samsara is without discoverable beginning. 
A first point is not discerned of beings roaming and wandering on hindered 
by ignorance and fettered by craving. What do you think, bhikkhus, which 
is more: the stream of tears that you have shed as you roamed and 
wandered on through this long course, weeping and wailing because of 
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being united with the disagreeable and separated from the agreeable—this 
or the water in the four great oceans?” 
“As we understand the Dhamma taught by the blessed one, venerable 
sir, the stream of tears that we have shed as we roamed and wandered 
through this long course, weeping and wailing because of being united with 
the disagreeable and separated from the agreeable — this alone is more 
than the water in the four great oceans.” 108 
At the core, it is the same dialectical movement consisting of dependent and interrelated 
parts. The difference lies in whether or not one is aware of and acknowledges this movement; 
this slight difference decides emancipation or suffering. To realize that life is suffering is not to 
hold an unfounded pessimism, but to recognize that living a life of desire and alienation while 
unconscious of their connection will always result in contradictions. Without dialectical 
understanding and awareness of dependency, life is an unending cycle of alienation and desire, 
of transgression and possession, of rising to the highest heights and falling to the lowest lows, 
and the desperate sense that there is nothing one can do about it. These patterns repeat 
themselves both in political economy and in the lives of individuals. 
For this reason the most serious problems with political economy—from its beginnings in 
exchange to the advanced stage of spectacular society—are not its end-results (war, competition, 
exploitation, etc.), what Debord calls visible domination. The most serious problem with the 
capitalistic system is that it “conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labor by not 
considering the direct relationship between the worker (labor) and production.”109 It is a system 
that is enmeshed in and embraces ignorance or, in Hegelian terminology, abstraction. It 
“produces... idiocy, cretinism.”110  
Ignorance keeps the laborer trapped within political economy. The laborer does not see 
that the way to overcome political economy begins with understanding the nature of labor and 
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changing it, to the extent possible, from alienated to non-alienated labor. Instead the laborer may 
resort to ideology, religion, drugs or other forms of the spectacle to escape this reality; 
alternately he may follow a path of activism or even violence to change his predicament. The 
laborer, against the master of labor, embodies “the negative side of the antagonism, its 
disturbance within itself, private property abolished and in the process of abolishing itself.”111 
The laborer does not see the path towards his own freedom. Even were he to destroy the master 
of labor, his freedom will not be long lasting because as a fugitive he would have to guard his 
semblance of freedom.  
On the other hand, the master of labor, out of self-interest, exploits the laborer. The 
master of labor is the opposite of the laborer. “This is the positive side of the antagonism, private 
property satisfied with itself.”112 In terms of status, the laborer and the master of labor are 
different from one another but in their ignorance they are the same. “The possessing class and 
the proletarian class represent one and the same human self-alienation.”113 But the master of 
labor, “feels satisfied and affirmed in this self-alienation, experiences the alienation as a sign of 
its own power, and possesses in it the appearance of a human existence.”114 The master of labor, 
through his exploitation, invites his own demise at the hand of the laborer; furthermore he is 
unaware that he is leading “an inhuman existence.”115 By denying the human nature of others, he 
acts in “blatant, outright and all-embracing denial”116 of his own human nature. His exploitation 
is his ruin.  
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Political economy is not an accident that befalls humans. It is simply a reality that is born 
from our relations. “Not the gods, not nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over 
man.”117 Hence, to overcome political economy is to overcome our ignorance. To merely attack 
visible domination does not address the causes of alienation. Ignorance regenerates and 
perpetuates them. The same holds for the suffering of an individual within political economy. 
When one feels that society has robbed one’s own humanity, the will to power emerges. “If 
socialist writers attribute this world-historical role to the proletariat, this is by no means, as 
critical criticism assures us, because they regard the proletariat as gods.”118 Willpower provides 
only a temporary relief if one remains attached to the self, which ultimately means an attachment 
to alienation. 
What makes truth immanent and apparent for us is the immediacy of its dialectical 
movement in our lives. This same immediacy also causes the greatest difficulty for us, because it 
“demands of the thoughtless thinker that he bring both laws together and become aware of their 
antithesis.”119 The process of bringing what seem like two opposites together and recognizing 
that they actually depend on each other is difficult because, at the beginning, the consciousness 
that desires independence and individuality sees the recognition of dependency as a disservice to 
itself. There is nothing to gain and so much to lose. It looks like giving up one’s own freedom. 
“Whether on the throne or in chains, in the utter dependence of its individual existence, its aim is 
to be free.”120 Self-consciousness does not want to be dependent. Self-consciousness identifies 
absolute individuality with freedom and dependency with bondage.   
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What it takes for self-consciousness to realize that the acknowledgement of dependency 
actually leads to true independence and freedom rather than obtaining independence through 
abstraction and isolation is work. It takes a working consciousness to realize “The truth of the 
independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of the bondsman.”121 This 
does not mean that to be free is to be a bondsman or to be a slave. But it means that there is 
something about freedom that the bondsman knows that the consciousness of the lord, obsessed 
with his own individuality, does not. 
Through work, the worker understands that freedom is not the belief that “I am free, 
because I am not in an other, but remain simply and solely in communion with myself,”122 and 
the determination to be “not distinct from myself.”123 The worker realizes that freedom is not an 
inherent state of being or an essence that he possesses. When, finally, consciousness successfully 
achieves a state of total isolation, when "all restraints have been cast off... having divided against 
itself, all identity, all existence,”124 it does not find itself to be free. Contrary to its expectation, 
consciousness “stands on the very edge of this innermost abyss, of this bottomless depth, in 
which all stability and Substance have vanished... wholly devoid of essentiality.”125 In the 
moment of isolation, apart from others, consciousness was not able to discover an essence that it 
can call a self but it discovers itself as “this expendable, self-less being.”126 On its own, it is 
nothing. It is only something when it is in relation to another.  
In a society where no one can any longer be recognized by others, each 
individual becomes incapable of recognizing his own reality.127 
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 The self is not defined by its opposition to others, as we commonly suppose. The self 
owes its existence to the other as when, at the start of self-consciousness, it consumes things, 
things it deems “inorganic nature”128 and necessary for its own survival. Marx echoes Hegel: 
“Nature is man’s inorganic body...That man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to nature 
means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.”129  This is the first 
moment of work which is consciousness’ coming to terms with the knowledge that it is 
dependent, the first characteristic of work and being a worker. It is in this regard that Hegel 
considers work to be discipline. It consists of two things, service and obedience. “Without the 
discipline of service and obedience, fear remains at the formal stage, and does not extend to the 
known real word of existence.”130 
Service and obedience imply a relationship between the bondsman and the lord that is 
“one-sided and unequal,”131 since the bondsman appears, in the lord’s eyes, the lesser and 
unessential. Everything that the bondsman makes is not for himself but for the bondsman. 
However, the fact that the bondsman is producing out of service and obedience helps him 
transcend the fear of losing himself; his work is not for his own aggrandizement.  
The bondsman’s labor is purely for another; this is the opposite of wage labor. Wage 
labor is purely done out of fear because, in wage labor, there is a self to be kept alive. “Labor 
power is, therefore, a commodity which its possessor, the wage-worker, sells to capital. Why 
does he sell it? In order to live.”132  Hence, money possesses such great power in a society of 
wage labor because, for the wage-laborer, it has the power to keep him alive. With wage labor, it 
is hard to see work as service and obedience, to see work as for another.  
                                                            
128 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 107.  
129 Tucker, Marx‐Engels Reader, “Estranged Labour”, 75.  
130 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 119.  
131 Ibid, 116. 
132 Tucker, Marx‐Engels Reader, “Wage Labour and Capital”, 204.  
  36
In service and obedience, self-consciousness realizes “lordship has in reality turned out to 
be different from an independent consciousness. What now really confronts him is not an 
independent consciousness, but a dependent one.”133 This insight is more than just a thought of 
the bondsman reassuring himself that the lord is not that powerful. It is actually an insight into 
the nature of existence in general. Obviously the lord acquires his physical livelihood and his 
identity, overall, his existence, through the bondsman; but the bondsman, in serving the lord, also 
acquires his own existence, albeit, the existence of a bondsman. “In production, men not only act 
on nature but also on one another.”134 The bondsman in keeping the lord alive, in turn, is also 
keeping himself alive.  
This is how the bondsman enters the real world of existence; the bondsman understands 
that existence is dependent. The more he exemplifies service and obedience, the clearer this 
insight is for him. For those who understand this dependency, all actions are done willingly out 
of service and obedience to others—they do not appear to be actions at all, because they are 
harmonious.  
Therefore the sage manages affairs without action,  
Carries out teachings without speech. 
Ten thousand things arise and he does not initiate them,  
They come to be and he claims no possession of them,  
He works without holding on, 
Accomplishes without claiming merit. 
Because he does not claim merit, 
His merit does not go away.135 
 The same kind of work is done in the Buddhist practice of meditation, which is 
sometimes referred to as “work of mind,” directed towards the comprehension of dependent 
origination. In the Majjhima Nikaya, in the “Anapanasati Sutta”, the method of meditation that 
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begins with mindfulness of in-breaths and out-breaths, is supposed to help consciousness become 
aware of the dependency between in-breaths and out-breaths, between breath and body, between 
body and mind states, and so on. Awareness of dependency leads to an understanding of self not 
as a substance, but as an aggregation of interrelated parts.  
The recognition of dependency is how individuals overcome alienation. As Marx says, 
“The individual is the social being. His life...is therefore an expression and confirmation of 
social life.”136 Recognition of the social character of human existence is essential to liberation. It 
is not that social life is superior to the life of the individual, but that life itself is fundamentally 
social and thus dependent.  
When working consciousness acknowledges that its existence is dependent on others, it 
does not remain passive. Self-consciousness must go outside itself and determine itself through 
its dealing with others (whether things or people) because those relations define its being. 
Consciousness is what it does in relation to others.  
As individuals express their life, so are they. What they are thus coincides 
with their production, both with what they produce and how they produce 
as well… it is not consciousness that determines life but life which 
determines consciousness.137 
The movement of self-consciousness outside itself in order to actualize itself is the 
second moment of work. By overcoming alienation through the acknowledgement of 
dependency, consciousness overcomes desire by inverting it: what was a desire to get from 
others becomes service to others. It is not getting what I desire and holding on to it that make me 
who I am. This contrasts with, for example, the one-sided belief of the capitalist who defines 
himself by accumulation, or even by the exploitation of others in order to get what he wants. 
This process of the self-becoming of self-consciousness through its relations with others appears 
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in the Phenomenology in the bondsman's relationship to the object: “he only works on it.”138 
When the bondsman “forms and shapes the thing,”139 he knows that his work is not just for 
subsistence. By working on the object he creates himself; “in his service he actually brings this 
about.”140 Similarly, when a craftsman makes a table, the finished product reflects the being of 
the craftsman. What he makes reflects his needs, not merely his desires.  
How can we distinguish needs from desires, especially in an age when the two are 
systematically confounded, e.g. by the field of marketing? To begin with, a need may be defined 
by the worker's willingness to work for its satisfaction; the worker recognizes that his needs can 
be satisfied only by work. When the worker produces to meet his needs, his needs and the work 
that he has put into are not separated from each other. The end product is not the only thing that 
matters for the worker. The whole working process is just as important, since the worker thereby 
exercises his capacity to actualize reality. The need of the worker is a combination of both the 
need for what the object (the table) can provide and the need to bring this about.   
But for wage-labor, work appears only a means to satisfy one's needs. His needs are not 
satisfied by his own work but by the wage that he receives at the end of his labor. “His labour is 
therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it.”141 
Because there is a disconnection between needs and work, the laborer’s needs may be degraded 
to nothing more than animalistic desires. “Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are also 
genuinely human functions. But in the abstraction which separates them from the sphere of all 
other human activity and turns them into sole and ultimate ends, they are animal.”142 Marx is 
enumerating the basic activities people engage in outside of labor time; for wage laborers these 
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activities tend to become the whole of their existence outside of working hours. We may disguise 
these activities as higher pursuits—making a culinary fetish of eating and drinking, valorizing 
sex as passion—but in the state of alienation they remain essentially animalistic. “What is animal 
becomes human and what is human becomes animal.”143  
Ultimately, humans need to work, to engage in conscious activity productive of life; this 
is what distinguishes man from animal. “Conscious life-activity directly distinguishes man from 
animal life-activity.”144 Consciousness cannot just wait passively doing nothing because by 
doing nothing it is nothing. With work, one's humanity is as stake. The unalienated worker 
realizes his humanity in work. Life and work are not separated.  
Or, as the Buddha puts it, consciousness is simply its actions.  
"A disciple of the noble ones considers this: 'I am not the only one who is 
owner of my actions, heir to my actions, born of my actions, related 
through my actions, and have my actions as my arbitrator; who — 
whatever I do, for good or for evil, to that will I fall heir. To the extent that 
there are beings — past and future, passing away and re-arising — all 
beings are the owner of their actions, heir to their actions, born of their 
actions, related through their actions, and have their actions as their 
arbitrator. Whatever they do, for good or for evil, to that will they fall heir.' 
When he/she often reflects on this, the [factors of the] path take birth. 
He/she sticks with that path, develops it, cultivates it. As he/she sticks with 
that path, develops it and cultivates it, the fetters are abandoned, the 
obsessions destroyed."145 
 But not just any action creates the self; actions for others are what actualize individuality. 
It is not enough for one to be good, one has to actually do good for others. It is not enough to 
preach kindness, one has to actually show kindness to others. It is not enough to appear wise, one 
has to actually spread wisdom to others. One changes the world through one’s actions towards 
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others. And when those actions have effects on others, one’s own being changes in the process. 
In this way the contradictions entailed by a world of independently existing selves is 
eliminated—one realizes that the two sides (the relationship of consciousness to things, or to 
other people) are not oppositional. The change in one is change in the other. The other’s being is 
my own being. It is the ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I’. This is why Marx says:  
Assume man to be man and his relationship to the world to be a human 
one: then you can exchange love only for love, trust only for trust, etc. If 
you want to enjoy art, you must be an artistically-cultivated person; if you 
want to exercise influence over other people, you must be a person with a 
stimulating and encouraging effect on other people. Every one of your 
relations to man and to nature must be a specific expression, 
corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life. 146 
 In the process, the two moments of desire are also overcome. Transgression is replaced 
by love.  
“One whose mind all day and night 
Takes delight in harmlessness, 
Who has loving kindness for all beings— 
For him there is enmity with none.”147 
And possession is replaced by giving.  
“Here one should give a proper gift, 
Here a gift bears great fruit. 
That’s how, for one bestowing alms, 
An offering brings success — just so!”148 
Only through others one “becomes conscious of what he truly is.”149 But wage labor is 
for the sole purpose of sustaining oneself: “What he produces for himself is wages, and silk, 
gold, palace resolve themselves for him into a definite quantity of the means of subsistence, 
perhaps into a cotton jacket, some copper coins and a lodging in a cellar.”150 Thus not only is the 
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wage laborer alienated, or estranged, from others because he produces only for himself, he is also 
estranged from himself. “Here we have self-estrangement, as we had previously the 
estrangement of the thing.”151 This is why, for Marx, wage labor is estranged labor—the more 
one engages in it the more one is alienated. Wage labor and political economy begin with the self 
yet stray further and further away from the self and culminate in self-estrangement. By contrast, 
the movement of the dialectic and dependent origination begins with recognition of the other and 
proceeds, not to self-estrangement, but to a return to unity with oneself, understood as dependent. 
“Returning is the movement of Tao.”152  
Finally, we come back to the question, what does it mean that “The truth of the 
independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of the bondsman”? How is it 
the case that consciousness achieves freedom by recognizing its utter dependency? In the second 
moment of work, consciousness works on the thing thus makes itself actual, is loved when it 
loves, is trusted when it trusts, is wealthy when it enriches others; the same dialectical 
relationship holds for freedom. I am free only when others are free. I cannot be free when others 
are subjugated and I am aloof from others and their sufferings. If I perceive my freedom as 
separate from everyone else’s freedom, then I will arrive at contradictions and conflicts when my 
interests and those of others collide. Just as if I want to be loved I have to love, if I want to be 
trusted I have to trust, then in order to be free I have to free others. And one does that through the 
act of letting go or non-action.  
“And how, bhikkhus, is a bhikkhu a universal conqueror? When, having 
understood as they really are the origin, the passing away, the 
gratification, the danger, and the escape in regard to the six bases for 
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contact, a bhikkhu is liberated by nonclinging, such a bhikkhu is a 
universal conqueror.”153 
 Or in the Tao Te Ching: 
To pursue Tao one decreases daily. 
To decrease and again to decrease, 
Until one arrives at not doing.  
Not doing and yet nothing is not done.154 
 Letting go or non-action should not be understood as self-denial or passivity. When 
consciousness, even with understanding of the dialectic and dependency, has other goals such as 
love, wealth, or reputation, there is still present the distinction between self and other, lover and 
beloved, and so on. There is still an expectation of receiving something in return. As Marx says, 
“If you love without evoking love in return — that is, if your loving as loving does not produce 
reciprocal love; if through a living expression of yourself as a loving person you do not make 
yourself a loved person then your love is impotent — a misfortune.”155 Normally, even with 
what we assume is the selfless act of love, there is still a longing for reciprocal love — otherwise 
it is a lost cause.  In this case, the individual is not yet free because he loves only to be loved in 
return. Letting go or non-action is not a rejection of the other; it does not merely accept what is 
agreeable and deny what is disagreeable, “This letting-go is the same renunciation of the one-
sidedness of the Notion that in itself constituted the beginning.”156 It is a full acceptance of what 
the other is and, therefore, a complete understanding of the other and its movement, “knowing is 
this seeming inactivity which merely contemplates how what is differentiated spontaneously 
moves in its own self and returns to its unity.”157  
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Therefore, the Tao Te Ching evokes the image of the mother to represent the quality of 
the Tao, “which may be called the mother of all under heaven”158 because, like motherly love, it 
brings everything into existence yet lets go of everything. It is all pervasive and nowhere to be 
found; hence, it is most dependent since it is connected to all things yet it is freest since it does 
not cling to anything.  
Letting go and non-action are what give us the opportunity to create a space for dialogue 
and for dialogue to be successful. “The point is to actually participate in the community of 
dialogue.”159 Without letting go of “individual life in its abstract form,”160 the sense of self that 
opposes others, dialogue would only be conversations, talks or different forms of what ultimately 
are just monologues. “The spectator’s consciousness no longer knows anyone but fictitious 
interlocutors who subject him to a one-way monologue.”161 
By fully accepting and knowing the other, through the dialectic and the recognition of 
dependency, self-consciousness becomes self-knowledge. The line between self and other, lord 
and bondsman, and the distinction itself is eroded, “Each in relation to the other lets go of the 
independent determinateness.”162  Letting go and non-action is the actualization of this eroding 
of distinctions; it is activity within inactivity. For Marx, communism is the supersession of 
distinctions and separations. “Now I say to you: Give up your abstraction.”163  Hegel echoes the 
Buddha: “This release of itself from the form of its Self is the supreme freedom and assurance of 
its self-knowledge.”164 For Debord, the concept of class itself dissolves. “This historic mission of 
establishing truth in the world can be carried out neither by the isolated individual nor by 
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atomized and manipulated masses, but only and always by the class that is able dissolve all 
classes,”165 a class that lets go of class itself, and lets go of the idea that revolution entails one 
class eliminating its opposition to remain standing as the true reigning class. This is the negation 
of the negation, the antithesis of the antithesis. This is the third and the final moment of work.  
Although this is the final moment, it is not the end. The final moment is not just the end 
nor the beginning, it is also both. It is the moment of consciousness realizing History. 
“History…is a conscious, self-mediating process — Spirit emptied out into Time...the negative is 
the negative of itself.”166  It is not merely a moment of detached observation. When Hegel says 
that History is a self-mediating process he means that consciousness is engaged with every 
unfolding of historical or just day-to-day events with an openness devoid of abstraction. It also 
means that consciousness is connected to reality directly without relying on representations, 
mediations, or images to reconcile itself with its reality, “where dialogue has armed itself to 
impose its own conditions.”167 In other words, because History is a self-mediating process; it 
requires consciousness to interact and engage. Thus History is an endless movement of relations 
and interactions. However, when historical consciousness is achieved, the movement continues 
not as the movement of alienation or suffering perpetuated by ignorance. Consciousness 
understands the world, things, and people, “as they are in themselves.”168 This understanding 
manifests itself as community, “an association of free men, working with the means of 
production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labor-power in full 
self-awareness as one single social labor force.” 169  
                                                            
165 Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, Section 221.  
166 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 492.  
167  Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, Section 221.  
168 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 493.  
169 Marx, Capital, 171.  
  45
To speak of one single social labor force is not to reduce the many different forms of 
labor-power into an abstract unity. In actuality, it is the awareness that despite the myriad forms 
of labor-power they all depend on one another; that is what unites them into one single social 
labor force. Cultivating historical self-awareness is no easy task. As Hegel says, “the progress 
towards this goal is also unhalting, and short of it no satisfaction is to be found at any stations on 
the way.”170 This should not discourage us. Instead, it should give us hope about what we can 
accomplish within the realm of political economy, capitalism, and spectacular society, even 
without a dazzling miracle to transform our circumstances.  
If we have chosen the position in life in which we can most of all work for 
mankind, no burdens can bow us down, because they are sacrifices for the 
benefit of all; then we shall experience no petty, limited, selfish joy, but 
our happiness will belong to millions, our deeds will live on quietly but 
perpetually at work, and over our ashes will be shed the hot tears of noble 
people.171 
Or, in the words of the Tao Te Ching:  
The sage never tries to store things up. 
The more he does for others, the more he has. 
The more he gives to other, the greater his abundance. 
The Tao of heaven is pointed but does no harm. 
The Tao of the sage is work without effort.172                                                                   
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Chapter 2: Separation Perfected  
 
Separation is the alpha and omega of the spectacle.  
(The Society of the Spectacle, Page 8, Section 25) 
 
 
Both the Buddha and Debord see natural consciousness’ view of reality—the view that is 
held by non-historical, non-dialectical consciousness, and by beings who have not comprehend 
dependent origination—as a disease or pathology. In the previous chapter, we saw how the 
Buddha says to the person who does not understand dependent origination that his reality is 
“covered as with blight.”173 The Buddha also speaks further about how the recovery of a sick 
person is similar to the path towards enlightenment for consciousness.  
"There are these three types of sick people to be found existing in the 
world. … 
"In the same way, these three types of people, like the three types of sick 
people, are to be found existing in the world. Which three? 
"There is the case of the person who — regardless of whether he does or 
doesn't get to see the Tathagata, regardless of whether he does or doesn't 
get to hear the Dhamma & Discipline proclaimed by the Tathagata — will 
not alight on the lawfulness, the rightness of skillful mental qualities. There 
is the case of the person who — regardless of whether he does or doesn't 
get to see the Tathagata, regardless of whether he does or doesn't get to 
hear the Dhamma & Discipline proclaimed by the Tathagata — will alight 
on the lawfulness, the rightness of skillful mental qualities. There is the 
case of the person who will alight on the lawfulness, the rightness of skillful 
mental qualities if he gets to see the Tathagata and gets to hear the 
Dhamma & Discipline proclaimed by the Tathagata, but not if he doesn't. 
"Now, it is because of the person who will alight on the lawfulness, the 
rightness of skillful mental qualities if he gets to see the Tathagata and gets 
to hear the Dhamma & Discipline proclaimed by the Tathagata — but not 
if he doesn't — that the teaching of the Dhamma has been allowed. And it 
is because there is this sort of person that the other sorts of persons are to 
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be taught the Dhamma as well [on the chance that they may actually turn 
out to need and benefit from the teaching]. 
"These are the three types of people, like the three types of sick people, to 
be found existing in the world."174 
Debord describes spectacular society and its inhabitants as plagued by “a universal 
autism;”175 he cites Joseph Gabel’s False Consciousness: An Essay on Reification: 
…the obscuration of the dialectical aspect of things produces… autistic 
and mal-adapted collective behavior… [and] on the other hand, the 
appearance of utopian consciousness.176 
When the Buddha compares ignorance with blight, he does not mean that ignorance is a 
physical or even psychological disease, but a condition of being human. Neither is Debord 
invoking a mere physical and psychological disorder but a condition that is faced by the whole 
society. 
The fracturing of practice and the antidialetical false consciousness that 
results from that fracturing are imposed at every moment of everyday life 
subjected to the spectacle—a subjection that systematically destroys the 
“faculty of encounter” and replaces it with a social hallucination: a false 
consciousness of encounter, an “illusion of encounter.”177  
This is what Gabel calls schizophrenia: “My definition is centred on the notion of ‘Depravat’ 
(deprivation) interpreted as a schizophrenic loss of dialectical perception of reality, that is to say, 
as a manifestation of reified consciousness.”178  
The schizophrenic experience as the loss of dialectical reality is at the center of advanced 
capitalism, the form of capitalism that seeks to resolve its internal contradictions through what 
Marx calls the real subsumption of labor under capital. At this stage, capital seems to have 
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“acquired the occult ability to add value to itself.”179 “This power which maintains old values 
and creates new ones is the power of capital, and that process is accordingly the process of self-
valorization. Consequently it spells the impoverishment of the worker who creates value as value 
alien to himself.”180 The contradiction is resolved when, in response to the autonomy of 
consciousness, reality itself becomes something that is also autonomous and self-maintained. 
Capitalism has acquired a life of its own, consummated in universal alienation and desire. Each 
side has secured its own sphere of abstract autonomy and this is the perfection of separation. 
This is what Debord calls the society of the spectacle. “It reveals itself for what it is: an 
autonomously developing separate power, based on the increasing productivity resulting from an 
increasingly refined division of labor into parcelized gestures dictated by the independent 
movement of machines and working for an ever-expanding market.”181 How real subsumption of 
labor under capital and the society of the spectacle come about is the central issue of this chapter.  
Schizophrenia is a medical term describing a psychological disorder with a biological 
component. Typical stages of a schizophrenic breakdown are described by the writer Andrew 
Solomon.  
When I came home, I felt a return of panic, and sadness of dinosaur 
proportions…I thought that I would die alone, and that there was no good 
reason to stay alive, and I thought that the normal and real world in which 
I had grown up, and which I believed that other people lived, would never 
open itself up to receive me.”182  
 
The standard treatment for this condition is pharmaceutical drugs.  
Every morning and every night, I look at the pills in my hand: white, pink, 
red, turquoise. Sometimes they seem like writing in my hand, hieroglyphics 
saying that the future may be all right and that I owe it to myself to live on 
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and see. I feel sometimes as though I am swallowing my own funeral twice 
a day, since without these pills, I’d be long gone.”183  
 
Here we see the schizophrenic disorder in its fully mature stage. 
But to see schizophrenia as merely physical or psychological may be to see only its 
symptoms. Just as political economists confine themselves to the surface of political economy by 
imagining it as a system of laws (“He merely pushes the question away into a grey nebulous 
distance. He assumes in the form of fact, of an event, what he is supposed to deduce”184), an 
external understanding of schizophrenia also falls short. “Critical analysis of man’s condition 
does not go deep enough into the determining cause of his inner phenomena; it does not follow 
the links of this chain down to the original phenomenon. It stops too quickly at the 
symptoms.”185 There is something about the condition of a person who is suffering schizophrenia 
that is shared by inhabitants of the realm of political economy and the spectacle. It is the loss of 
reality through the destruction of the “faculty of encounter” or, in other words, the inability to 
directly encounter reality which is the fundamental characteristic that underlies both the being of 
the schizophrenic and the inhabitants of political economy. That is not to say that the 
schizophrenic is not actually sick and that his disorder is merely a social or a theoretical 
phenomenon. Rather, it is to say that the schizophrenic is not the only one who is sick. If we 
believe the Buddha and Debord, the illness is pervasive.  
If we take the schizophrenic experience as the loss of dialectical reality, then, by reading 
Hegel and Marx, we notice the onset of schizophrenia happens very early for consciousness. In 
“Estranged Labour”, the laborer already experiences something like schizophrenia. “In the 
conditions dealt with by political economy this realization of labour appears as loss of reality for 
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the workers; objectification as loss of the object and object-bondage; appropriation as 
estrangement, as alienation. So much does labour’s realization appear as loss of reality that the 
worker loses reality to the point of starving to death.”186 The laborer is already a schizophrenic 
when he enters political economy or, more accurately, when the laborer realizes he is within 
political economy he sees himself as schizophrenic.  
In the Phenomenology, self-consciousness becomes schizophrenic when it perceives itself 
as not just an autonomous and independent being but a being that is essentially unhappy.  
This unhappy, inwardly disrupted consciousness, since its essentially 
contradictory nature is for it a single consciousness, must for ever have 
present in the one consciousness of the other also; and thus it is driven out 
of each in turn in the very moment when it imagines it has successfully 
attained to a peaceful unity with the other.187 
Self-consciousness is unhappy when it not only finds itself unable to hold on to its object of 
desire, but in so doing finds that the very act of desiring has failed to do what it supposed it was 
doing: hold on to reality. Self-consciousness does not realize and cannot accept that, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, desire automatically brings about alienation or loss of reality. Instead, 
when self-consciousness becomes Unhappy Consciousness, it takes alienation as its essence. 
Unhappy Consciousness has thoroughly identified itself with unrequited desire. Because self-
consciousness cannot see itself as anything else but as a desiring being, it feels that it is 
condemned to be unhappy. Prior to Unhappy Consciousness, self-consciousness refuses to admit 
defeat, just as the schizophrenic will at first deny that he has any disorder by trying to hold on to 
reality, trying to keep himself whole. But, eventually, the schizophrenic, like Unhappy 
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Consciousness, acknowledges himself as “That which is mended is but patched and can never be 
whole again.”188  
For both the laborer and the Unhappy Consciousness, there is already the seed of 
schizophrenia when consciousness first encounters the object. Hence, we do not need to wait 
until the severe symptoms appear as breakdowns, hallucinations, etc. to consider existence as 
schizophrenic. Schizophrenia is simply the natural outcome of self-consciousness. The difference 
between schizophrenia as a medical condition and schizophrenia as illusion of encounter is a 
difference in magnitude. 
  The schizophrenic or Unhappy Consciousness, despite being overwhelmed by suffering, 
is nonetheless clearly aware of his own condition. “You are in touch with the real terribleness of 
life;”189 the schizophrenic understands that reality is not his. He is not the owner of reality and, 
ultimately, he is not even the owner of himself. “Unhappy Consciousness is the consciousness of 
self as a dual natured, merely contradictory being… The Unhappy Consciousness itself is the 
gazing of one self-consciousness into another.”190 Unlike self-consciousness at the stage of self-
certainty (when it is only concerned with absolute individuality at the expense of the other), 
Unhappy Consciousness, although concerned with its own individuality, now knows that the 
other is just as real 
Yet, it is a truth that is one-sided and reified into another moment of false consciousness. 
Although it sees the other as real, Unhappy Consciousness still imagines that the other is 
separated from itself. The other is seen as a beyond, “a supersensible world which henceforth is 
the true world."191 For Unhappy Consciousness things become things-in-themselves. “The inner 
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world is, for consciousness, still a pure beyond, because consciousness does not as yet find itself 
in it.”192 As the other consciousness, it becomes something godlike that confronts Unhappy 
Consciousness. “The first Unchangeable it knows only as an alien Being who passes judgment 
on the particular individual.”193  
The estranged laborer in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 also 
exemplifies this encounter of consciousness with what it imagines as the beyond. 
If my one activity does not belong to me, if it is an alien, a coerced 
activity, to whom, then does it belong? 
 
To a being other than me. 
 
Who is this being? 
 
The gods? To be sure, in the earliest times the principal production (for 
example, the building of temples, etc., in Egypt, India and Mexico) appears 
to be in the service of gods, and the product belongs to the gods.194  
 
To be sure, laborers during Marx’s time were not subject to the same gods as the Egyptians, 
Indians, and Mexicans. Godlike status is transferred to the master of labor who gives the laborer 
the means of his livelihood. “But the worker, whose sole source of livelihood is the sale of his 
labour power, cannot leave the whole class of purchasers, that is, the capitalist class.”195 Just as 
the God of Unhappy Consciousness is real because he is the creator of life, the capitalist class is 
also real because it is the source of the laborer’s livelihood. However, it is a reality that is 
inaccessible and hidden from the laborer. “The meaning which production has in relation to the 
rich is seen revealed in the meaning which it has for the poor. At the top the manifestation is 
always refined, veiled, ambiguous…”196 The same holds for the schizophrenic who wonders 
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about the origin of his suffering, how it is so real yet so foreign. His own condition is beyond 
words and, in the end, incommunicable.  
It was clear to my rational mind that I was going crazy again, 
and the awareness tired me further…I needed to her another voice, 
even if only briefly, that could penetrate my fearful isolation… 
 
“Hello?” she asked. “Hi”, I said, and paused. “Has something 
happened?” she asked. It was immediately clear that I could not 
explain what had happened. I had nothing to say.197 
Since consciousness decides that the other is beyond its reach, this leaves consciousness 
no way to reconcile with the object and its reality. For this reason, Unhappy Consciousness and 
the schizophrenic can never be whole. “We have here only a personality confined to its own self 
and its own petty actions, a personality brooding over itself, as wretched as it is 
impoverished.”198 At the symptomatic level, it is a loss of reality. At a deeper level, the 
symptoms that consciousness experiences suggest consciousness’ incapacity to connect with 
reality. There is no way for consciousness to achieve unity and reconciliation with reality. 
“Where that ‘other’ is sought, it cannot be found, for it is supposed to be just a beyond, 
something that can not be found.”199 For the laborer this is the moment when not only the 
product of his labor is alienated from him, but labor itself becomes alienating. “If then the 
product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, the alienation of 
activity, the activity of alienation.”200 Labor as what establishes the connection between the 
laborer and the product of labor no longer serves its purpose, just as the desire of Unhappy 
Consciousness also fails to hold on to reality. This also goes for the schizophrenic: due to the 
immense gap between his disorder and reality, reality is beyond reach and untrainable. No matter 
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how hard he tries, reality is forever outside of him. He is “divorced from external reality.”201 
This is further elucidated by Elyn Saks in her book The Center Cannot Hold: My Journey 
through Madness chronicling her experience of schizophrenia.  
In fact, it is not necessarily true that everything can be conquered with 
willpower. There are forces of nature and circumstance that are beyond 
our control, let alone our understanding, and to insist on victory in the face 
of this, to accept nothing less is asking for a soul-pummeling. The simple 
truth is, not every fight can be won.202  
 As stated before, the realization of reality as independent from consciousness is a truth, 
but it is a truth that is one-sided and a moment of reified false consciousness. On the one hand, it 
is a truth because consciousness is finally able to acknowledge the other and, in the process, “it 
does indeed come out of itself”,203 which is a necessary movement towards dialectical and 
historical consciousness. This is, in Buddhism, the moment of mindfulness (sati), when the 
practitioner realizes that everything, including the self, is other from himself and, therefore, he 
can no longer say that this or that is his.  
 
Any kind of feeling whatsoever…Any kind of perception whatsoever…Any 
kind of volitional formations whatsoever…Any kind of consciousness 
whatsoever, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or 
subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, all consciousness should be seen as 
it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this 
not my self.”204 
 
But, without further work to dissolve this abstract distinction between self and other, it is a 
reification because consciousness imagines the other as inherently independent and inherently 
real. It is mindfulness without insights of the interdependent and dialectical reality. 
Consciousness takes two steps forward and one step back.  
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If ignorance is the root of the issue, then the repetitive returns and relapses of 
consciousness back to abstraction and its old patterns are moments of reification. 
“Reification…allows for a complete return.”205 It is a return and reemergence of ignorance and 
abstraction. In the Phenomenology, before arriving at absolute or historical consciousness, every 
transition made by consciousness from one shape or one stage to the next is a moment of 
reification because at the beginning of every stage is abstraction. Even at the later stage of 
Reason, consciousness is not yet immune to reification. “Its immediate appearance on the scene 
is the abstraction of its actual presence, the essence and the in-itself of which is the absolute 
Notion, i.e. the movement which has brought it into being.”206 The absolute Notion here means 
the dialectic. If ignorance was a sickness, then reification is a recontamination by the very same 
disease.  
The sage in Tao Te Ching is free from sickness because he not only knows about the 
sickness but also prevents himself from becoming sick again. It is because he knows that he is 
sick that he is free from sickness, and not because he thinks that he is healthy. Likewise, true 
wisdom begins with the acknowledgment that one is ignorant, rather than being certain and 
complacent about how much one knows. In this way, the sage uproots the tendency to reify his 
sickness.  
From knowing to not knowing, 
This is superior. 
From not knowing to knowing 
This is sickness. 
It is by being sick of sickness, 
That one is not sick.  
 
The sage is not sick. 
Because he is sick of sickness, 
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Therefore he is not sick.207 
 
 For Unhappy Consciousness recognition of the Other as a beyond is a moment of 
reification because, at the core, it remains self-consciousness. Although Unhappy Consciousness 
acknowledges the other as real, since it is self-consciousness, it still desires. It has let go of its 
abstract self-certainty but it has not let go of desire. Hence the longing and the gazing towards 
the other. It is desire but, this time, as Unhappy Consciousness, it is desire for the unattainable 
and the impossible. We can even say that the desire of Unhappy Consciousness is fetishistic; this 
fetishism is what differentiates the desire of self-certainty from the desire of Unhappy 
Consciousness.  
There the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures 
endowed with a life of their own which enter into relations both with each 
other and with the human race…I call this the fetishism which attaches 
itself to the products of labour…208 
Unhappy Consciousness desires this other that has “the basic characteristic of 
dividedness and being-for-self in contrast to the individual consciousness.”209 Unhappy 
Consciousness continues wishing to hold on to the other even if, in relation to the other, it has “a 
remote existence and remains utterly remote.”210 What remains is this sense of what seems 
almost like a religious longing towards the transcendent divine. “The hope of becoming one with 
it [the other] must remain a hope, i.e. without fulfillment and present fruition, for between the 
hope and its fulfillment there stands precisely the absolute contingency or inflexible indifference 
which lies in the very assumption of definite form, which was the ground of hope.”211 This 
internal tension between Unhappy Consciousness’ sense of futility and its unshakable desire 
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engenders “a purely casual, confused medley, the dizziness of a perpetually self-engendered 
disorder…this restless confusion.”212  
The laborer faces the same tension. On the one hand, he wants to live an ethical and 
virtuous life, a life dedicated to the good of others. In other words, a social life. But the laborer 
also asks himself, “How can I live virtuously if I do not live?”213 The tension is between the 
laborer’s social life and individual life. Marx addresses this tension in his writing On the Jewish 
Question. Marx frames the question around the situation of the German Jew. “The German Jews 
seek emancipation. What kind of emancipation do they want? Civic, political emancipation?”214 
But for Marx the predicament of the Jews in Germany represents the universal human tension 
between wanting emancipation in the personal, civil sphere and wanting emancipation in the 
political, social sphere. “With respect to the Jews the Christian state can only adopt the attitude 
of a Christian state. That is, it can permit the Jew, as a matter of privilege, to isolate himself from 
other subjects; but it must then allow the pressure of all the other spheres of society to bear upon 
the Jew, and all the more heavily since he is in religious opposition to the dominant religion.”215 
This is similar to the desire of Unhappy Unconsciousness since, for Marx, the Jew wants 
individual freedom while yearning for acceptance from society. This predicament is both a 
manifestation of Unhappy Consciousness and a prototype of the laborer's condition. The 
condition of the Jew represents the human condition; hence Marx’s statement, “The social 
emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism.”216 
This tension is even more intense for the schizophrenic because the tension is between 
two realities. One the one hand, the schizophrenic’s reality is always unstable and on the verge of 
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collapse. Within this reality, the schizophrenic is not only a threat to other people but also to 
himself. The reality of schizophrenia always undermines itself; the breakdowns begin within and 
spread outward into the external.   
Someone watching me. Something watching me. It’s been waiting for 
this moment for so many years, taunting me, sending me previews of what 
will happen. Always before, I’ve been able to fight back, to push it until it 
recedes –not totally, but mostly, until it resembles nothing more than 
malicious little speck off to the corner of my eye, camped near the edge of 
my peripheral vision.   
But now, with my arms and legs pinioned to a metal bed, my 
consciousness collapsing into a puddle, and no one paying attention to the 
alarms I’ve been trying to raise, there is finally nothing further to be done. 
Nothing I can do. There will be raging fires, and hundreds, maybe 
thousands of people lying dead on the streets. And it will all—all of it—be 
my fault.217 
On the other hand, there is conventional reality, one that the schizophrenic must live in 
accordance with.  This is the reality coming from the outside and internalized by the 
schizophrenic. It is the reality that demands that the schizophrenic should behave and conform to 
societal expectations—the demand for the schizophrenic to appear normal.  
Part of the problem was that I was behaving like a patient in 
psychoanalysis. When Mrs. Joense and I were working together, I was 
encouraged to say exactly what was on my mind, always, no matter how 
crazy it sounded—that was how analysis worked. That was the point. 
Otherwise, how would she know what was going on inside me? But the 
people at MU10 didn’t want to know. If they couldn’t tolerate what was in 
my head, why were any of them in this business? When my scrambled 
thinking revealed itself, they put me in the hospital version of “time out.” 
Where was the “treatment” in this? Were they wanting to help me get 
better, or did they just want me to be socially appropriate? Overall, the 
sole message they seemed to want me to get was “behave yourself!”218  
When these two realities collide, the schizophrenic no longer has a stable, unified sense of self. 
The schizophrenic now faces the fundamental contradiction of Unhappy Consciousness. The 
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schizophrenic is torn between two oppositions. Either the psychotic person is real or the social 
persona is real, but not both. It is between what the schizophrenic thinks he is and what the 
schizophrenic wants himself to be, between an unstable private life and a respectable social life.      
There were, in Kaplan’s way of thinking, three different lenses through 
which I viewed myself—three “me’s,” as he put it, although without any 
implication that these were actual selves or personalities or people or 
anything of that sort—it was purely a heuristic device. One me was Elyn, 
one me was Professor Saks, and the third me was “the Lady of the 
Charts”—the person who was mental patient… 
There were many days when I believed I was nothing more than the 
Lady of the Charts—a crazy woman who’d faked her way into a teaching 
job and would soon be discovered for what she really was and put where 
she really belonged—in a mental hospital. Other times, I denied that the 
Lady of the Charts even existed, because my illness wasn’t real…Because 
how could I reconcile the Lady of the Charts coexisting alongside Elyn and 
Professor Saks? Either I was mentally ill or I could have a full and 
satisfying personal and professional life, but both things could not be 
equally true; they were mutually exclusive states of being. To admit one 
was to deny the other. I simply couldn’t have it both ways. Didn’t anyone 
understand this?219  
 What consciousness needs to do is to find a way to reconcile with the other that is beyond 
it and, at the same time, preserve its own individuality. How can consciousness reach the other 
without undermining its desire? Consciousness accomplishes this dualistic task through 
mediation of the beyond. As Hegel says in the Phenomenology, “Being is then absolutely 
mediated.”220 At this point it might appear that the solution to the predicament of Unhappy 
Consciousness would be to get rid of mediation in order to have unmediated relations with 
people and things. However, Hegel really means it when he says that all consciousness is 
absolutely mediated. For Hegel, a dialectical relation is a mediated relation. 
Among the countless differences cropping up here we find in a every case 
that the crucial one is that…pure being at once splits into what we have 
called the two ‘Thises’, one this as ‘I’, and the other ‘This’ as object. When 
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we reflect on this difference, we find that neither one nor the other is only 
immediately present …, but each is at the same mediated: I have this 
certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it, similarly, 
is…through something else, viz. through the ‘I’.221 
In mediation, consciousness is being directly mediated by the other. And that which is on 
the other side of consciousness and behind the other is itself.  Mediation is the entire movement 
of consciousness coming out of itself and returning to finally find itself through the other. There 
is no beyond or supersensible thing in mediation. Consciousness is directly mediated by the other 
and the other is directly mediated by consciousness. The third movement for both sides is a 
return into themselves. Nevertheless, it is not a retreat to the sphere of abstract thought but it is a 
movement that carries with it the real recognition of the other as mutually dependent. 
Each is for the other the middle term, through which each meditates itself 
with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, 
and immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such 
only though this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually 
recognizing each other.222 
Therefore, even though mediation is a triadic process, it remains dialectical as a direct 
interrelatedness between two interdependent entities. This triadic sequence is found in the Tao Te 
Ching.  
Tao gives birth to one, 
One gives birth to two, 
Two gives birth to three, 
Three gives birth to ten thousand beings. 
Ten thousand beings carry yin on their backs and embrace yang in their front, 
Blending these two vital breaths to attain harmony.223 
 
The Tao as the sequence of one, two and three is the same order as the path of development for 
consciousness. Consciousness begins as an abstract unity, as one, comes out of itself as two and, 
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finally, returns to itself as three. This movement, whether we call it the Tao or dialectic, is 
performed by all beings and gives them birth.  
To say that consciousness is mediated by the other is to view the other as a means for its 
self-realization. This contrasts with Kant's attempt to provide a morality for political economy—
which views beings as autonomous—by enjoining us to treat beings as ends rather than means. 
For Kant “autonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature”224 
and, for that reason, “man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and 
not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.”225 Political economy likewise 
valorizes autonomy or estrangement. “It stems from the very nature of estrangement that each 
sphere applies to me a different and opposite yardstick—ethics one and political economy 
another; for each is a specific estrangement of man and focuses attention on a particular round of 
estranged essential activity.”226   
Nonetheless, to see the other as a means does not entail that the other is something to be 
used and then tossed aside. Seeing the other as a means is not to view nature or the other person 
as “an instrument for getting hold of absolute being.”227 Marx also speaks about the ways that 
people are viewed as instruments.  
The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the 
hallowed co-relation of parents and child, becomes all the more disgusting, 
the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties among the 
proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple 
articles of commerce and instruments of labour. 
But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams 
the bourgeoisie in chorus. 
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The bourgeois sees his wife a mere instrument of production. He hears 
that the instruments of production are to be exploited in common, and, 
naturally, can come to no other conclusion that the lot of being common to 
all will likewise fall to the women. 
He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away 
with the status of women as mere instruments of production.228 
To recognize the other as a means for realization but not as an instrument for exploitation 
is for consciousness to see its dependence on the other as the only way to know itself. For 
consciousness to engage in exploitation would itself be unconsciousness, a failure to recognize 
that in so doing it harms itself. As Hegel says in the Phenomenology, when consciousness wants 
to exploit the other, “Here, then, we have a struggle against an enemy, to vanquish whom is 
really to suffer defeat, where victory in one consciousness is really lost in its opposite.”229 
Paranoiac mistrust is equally unconscious because it shows that, in relation to the other, 
consciousness “is not as yet explicitly aware that this [other] is its essential nature, or that it is 
the unity of both.”230 The willingness to trust another in spite of the potential risk is an indication 
of awareness rather than ignorance.   
On this basis we can better understand the schizophrenic condition. Although the most 
alienating and antagonizing aspect of schizophrenia is the symptoms themselves, we can see that 
the symptoms are not actually the problem, just as the symptoms of political economy are not 
themselves the problem. The schizophrenic needs to encounter his symptoms directly in order to 
understand how schizophrenia shapes his experience and, in turn, how to overcome its causes—
the same holds for Unhappy Consciousness and the estranged laborer. This encounter is a return 
to dialectical reality, the deepest need of anyone suffering either the medical or the more 
prevalent form of schizophrenia.  
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…what has allowed me to see the meaning in my struggles—to make sense 
of everything that happened before and during the course of my illness, and 
to mobilize what strengths I may possess into a rich and productive life—is 
talk therapy. People like me with a thought disorder are not supposed to 
benefit much from this kind of treatment, a talk therapy oriented toward 
insight and based upon relationship. But I have. There may be a substitute 
for the human connection—for two people sitting together in a room, one of 
them with the freedom to speak her mind, knowing the other is paying 
careful and thoughtful attention—but I don’t know what that substitute 
might be. It is, at the heart of things, a relationship, and for me it has been 
the key to every other relationship I hold precious.231 
Saks is referring to the practice of psychoanalysis, but the effectiveness of her therapy was not 
due to the presence of an expert supposed, on her behalf, to resolve the problems and do the work 
for her. She was not engaging in a monologue but rather actively trying to participate in a 
dialogue, perhaps not explicitly in words but in her attitude. “I wanted to know how and why 
psychoanalysis had worked for me. I wanted to know what was in my analysts’ minds when they 
treated me. I wanted to experience being on the other side of the couch.”232 She is not fetishizing 
the analyst. Again, the analyst is there only to assist and, in the process, come to term with her 
disorder rather than running away from it. “Ironically, the more I accepted I had a mental illness, 
the less the illness defined me—at which point the riptide set me free.”233 
 In practice the actual tendency of the schizophrenic and the alienated individual is, 
instead, to turn away from the alienating reality. Mediation, as a process of direct and 
interdependent encounter between consciousness and others, becomes distorted into an interaction 
that is mediated by a third thing. “This mediated relation is thus a syllogism in which the 
individuality, initially fixed in its antithesis to the in-itself, is united with this order extreme only 
through a third term.”234 The mediator acts as the unifying and reconciling force that brings 
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together the two independent sides. Unhappy Consciousness encounters its mediator in the 
historical form of the minister or the priest. This third thing accomplishes what consciousness 
itself fails to do.  
Through this middle term the one extreme, the Unchangeable, is brought 
into relation with the unessential consciousness, which equally is brought 
into relation with the Unchangeable only through this middle term; thus 
this middle term is one which presents the two extremes to one another, 
and ministers to each in its dealing with the other.235 
The clerical mediator is seen as the one who is capable of connecting Unhappy Consciousness 
with the beyond because he has “a direct relationship with the Unchangeable.”236 This direct 
access is something that Unhappy Consciousness assumes that it does not possess. This surrender 
of Unhappy Consciousness, “The surrender of its own will,”237 appears to come from humility but 
in fact it conceals consciousness’ secret desire. By giving up its will (the means for consciousness 
to encounter the other) what it gets in return is a secure and intact sense of Self. This superficial 
humility fulfills the still-alienated desire of Unhappy Consciousness. The sense of self is secretly 
taken to a new height. Self-consciousness does not merely want to secure its own sphere of 
personal freedom. The clerical mediator allows self-consciousness to become all reality; this is 
what makes this third thing so appealing for Unhappy Consciousness. In this mediator Unhappy 
Consciousness can see itself. 
This unity of objectivity and being-for-self, which lies in the Notion of 
action, and which therefore becomes for consciousness essence and 
object—this unity is not the principle of its action, and so too it does not 
come an object for consciousness, directly and through itself. Rather, it lets 
the mediating minister express this certainty, a certainty which is itself still 
incomplete, that its misery is only in principle the reverse, i.e. that its 
action brings it only in principle self-satisfaction or blessed enjoyment; 
that is pitiable action too is only in principle the reverse, viz. an absolute 
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action; that in principle, action is only really action when it is the action of 
a particular individual. But for itself, action and its own actual doing 
remain pitiable, its enjoyment remains pain, and the overcoming of these in 
a positive sense remains a beyond. But in this object, in which it finds that 
its own action and being, as being that this particular  consciousness, are 
being and action in themselves, there has arisen for consciousness the idea 
of Reason, of the certainty that, in its particular individuality, it has being 
absolute in itself, or is all reality.238 
The mediator does not appear only in the form of the minister. The mediator appears in 
different forms within different settings. As a third thing, it does not have to be a person. For the 
laborer, as a producer, in order for his product to reach other people, he must bring his product to 
the market and participate in exchange. Those who enter the market do not enter it as human 
beings but as “owners of private properties.”239 Within exchange, these owners of private 
properties do not transact with each other directly but their products, as commodities, serve as 
mediators that come between the owners. Hence, on the market, people are not simply owners of 
private properties, they are guardians of commodities. “Commodities cannot themselves go to 
market and perform exchanges in their own right. We must, therefore, have recourse to their 
guardians, who are the possessors of commodities.”240   
Since exchange is, in capitalism, “a general social process”241, commodities are more than 
just an apparatus for exchange. Above all, the commodity is the producer’s sanction to participate 
in social life. Although commodities are what allow the guardians to interact with one another, 
they do not directly confront each other in the process of exchange. Each is absorbed in the search 
for use-value. “The owner of a commodity is prepared to part with it only in return for other 
commodities whose use-value satisfies his own need… exchange is merely an individual process 
for him… It does not matter to him whether his own commodity has any use-value for the owner 
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of the other commodity of not.”242 The commodity is the mediator for the producer because it is 
both personally useful and socially exchangeable. The commodity form is what sets boundaries 
between people but, more importantly, it is also what ties people together on the economic stage, 
which is simply the realm of social interactions mediated by commodities.  
Here the persons exist for one another merely as representatives and hence 
owners, of commodities…we shall find, in general, that the characters who 
appear on the economic stage are merely personifications of economic 
relations; it is as the bearers of these economic relations that they come 
into contact with each other.243 
 For both the wage-laborer and the master of labor, the meditator or third thing appears in 
two instances. In wage-labor, the laborer is not just a producer—he is not just in a relation 
between himself and the object. On the individual level, the wage is the third thing that comes in 
between the laborer and the product of his labor. The product that he makes is not “his direct 
means of life;”244  his product is something that is for other people on the market or for the master 
of labor. The laborer is willing to part with the product but he is not willing to part with his wage 
because that is “a means to enable him to exist.”245 On the side of the master of labor, his interest 
lies in the labor power of the laborers. From the master’s perspective, the laborer himself is the 
mediator. As the third thing, the laborer has now become a commodity, “He is a commodity 
which passes from the hand of one owner to that of another.”246 Being seen as a commodity is 
more than just being turned into a thing. Thinghood has a designated existence while a 
commodity is merely instrumental. That is why Marx sees the wage-laborer as worse off than the 
feudal serf. “The serf sells only a part of his labour power. He does not receive a wage from the 
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owner of the land; rather the owner of the land receives a tribute from him.”247 The wage 
concretizes the laborer’s existence as a commodity.  
 The schizophrenic may not see reality in terms of use-value, exchange-value, and so on. 
Elyn Saks, as a schizophrenic, simply wants a good and fulfilling life. “I also wanted to dispel the 
myths held by many mental-health professionals themselves—that people with a significant 
thought disorder cannot live independently, cannot work at challenging jobs, cannot have true 
friendships, cannot be in meaningful, sexually satisfying relationships, cannot lead lives of 
intellectual, spiritual, or emotional richness.”248 There is, of course, a price to be paid to dispel 
those myths and turn them into a reality. “I write, then, because I know what it’s like to be 
psychotic. And I know, better than most, how the law treats mental patients, the degradation of 
being tied to a bed against your will and force-fed medicine you didn’t ask for and do not 
understand.”249  
But there are other forms of coercion operating on the schizophrenic, as on the subjects of 
political economy, less dramatic than being coerced into a mental institution. This coercion may 
be gradualized, so as to win the schizophrenic's acceptance. The message may be: “I have a major 
mental illness. I will never fully recover from schizophrenia. I will always need to be on 
antipsychotic medication and in talk therapy. I will always have good days and bad, and I still get 
sick.”250 This leads to the conclusion: “But the treatment I have received has allowed a life I 
consider wonderfully worth living.”251 Seen in this light, it no longer appears that the 
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schizophrenic is being forced into treatment; the schizophrenic becomes willing to be part of the 
treatment even if it is potentially permanent. Furthermore, there is no reason to leave.  
That said, I don’t wish to be seen as regretting that I missed the life I could 
have had if I’d not been ill…With proper treatment, someone who is 
mentally ill can lead a full and rich life…My good fortune is not that I’ve 
recovered from mental illness. I have not, nor will I ever. My good fortune 
lies in having found my life.252 
This is not to castigate Saks for making the best out of her situation, or anyone seeking 
treatment. It is to better understand how Saks specifically and people with schizophrenia in 
general view their predicaments. The treatment is the mediator; it becomes all of reality for the 
schizophrenic. This can be in the form of the myriad drugs the patient has to take. “A number of 
drugs, such as BuSpar, which acts on certain nerves sensitive to serotonin, are used for long-term 
control of anxiety. There are also fast-acting drugs, the benzodiazepines –a category that includes 
Klonopin, Ativan, Valium, and Xanax.”253 The mediator for the schizophrenic can also be the 
therapist or psychiatrist. “I am lucky to have good insurance that pays for me to make weekly 
visits to a therapist and monthly visits to a psychopharmacologist.”254 Saks expresses her distress 
when her therapist did not meet her expectations, which only shows how vulnerable and desperate 
the schizophrenic’s situation is.  
My anger alternated with despair. My analyst, the one who was supposed 
to know me the best, the one whose job it was to help me navigate and 
understand my world, obviously thought I was ultimately slated to be 
nothing more than a street person. Well, then, maybe I should just move to 
the streets and be don’t with it. I’m destined for degradation. I belong on 
the streets. All else is pretense.255 
In the end, everything stays the same for the schizophrenic.  
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I’ve decided not to go off medications. I’m not sure that I’m addicted, but I 
am dependent: without the drugs I would run the risk of emerging 
symptoms of illness. It’s a fine line. I have gained an unbecoming amount 
of weight. I get weird hives for no apparent reason. I sweat more. My 
memory, never very good, is mildly impaired: I frequent forget what I am 
saying in the middle of a sentence. I get headaches a lot. I get occasional 
muscular cramps…It’s not ideal, but it seems to put up a real wall between 
me and my depression. The last two years are without question the best 
decade. Slowly, I will now catch up. When two friends died not long ago, 
both in freak-accidents, I felt terribly sad, but I did not feel myself slipping 
out of my hands, and to feel just grief was almost (I know this sounds 
terrible, but in some selfish way it is true) a kind of satisfaction.256  
Ultimately, the final option is not for the schizophrenic to find a way out but to entrust the future 
to the possibility of better and more efficient treatments.  
Researchers are working in four directions toward new treatments. The 
first is to shift as far as possible to preventative therapies: the sooner you 
can mental problems of any kind, the better off you are. The second is 
increased specificity of drugs…The third is faster drugs. The fourth is more 
specificity to symptom rather than to biological position, so that the 
experimentation to choose drugs can be abrogated.257 
The meditator or the third thing appears variously as a minister, as the commodity form, as 
wages, as drugs, and psychiatrists. All these forms can exist and occupy the same place at the 
same time. The problems of Unhappy Consciousness, the laborer, and of the schizophrenic are 
problems that all exist within today’s society. Awareness of the role that those mediating forms 
play within the dialectical movement reveals to us the basic underlying form that is shared by all 
these manifestations. As the third thing, the most basic form of the mediator is not strictly a 
material thing or person. Fundamentally, the third thing for consciousness is simply 
representations and images. Kant speaks of representation as our primary mode of knowledge.  
Now if we find that on the assumption that our cognition from experience 
conforms to the objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot 
be thought at all without contradiction, but that on the contrary, if we 
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assume that our representation of things as they are given to us does not 
conform to these things as they are in themselves but rather that these 
objects as appearances conform to our way of representing, then the 
contradiction disappears.258 
 Representations resolve the contradiction between the subjective world of concepts and 
the objective world of things. Representation, as the middle term, is where the two independent 
sides meet. With that statement, Kant renounces any hope of direct knowledge; knowledge or 
cognition must always rely on the middle term. This middle term is what Marx calls ideology in 
The German Ideology.  
Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all 
the product of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent 
existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians declared 
them the true bonds of human society).259 
But representations are not enough. Representations need a concrete existence. Images, like 
commodities, are material manifestations of representations.  
The spectacle is not a collection of images; it is a social relation between 
people mediated by images.260 
Together representations and images become spectacles. Representations are the mental mediator 
and images are the material mediator; together they are the two wheels which put spectacular 
society in motion. “In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, life is presented 
as an immense accumulation of spectacles.”261 The spectacle, like earlier forms of the third thing, 
is the force that unifies opposites. It no longer is confined to a specific setting, but now appears as 
the unifying force of all oppositions within reality.  
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The spectacle presents itself simultaneously as society itself, as a part of 
society, and as a means of unification. As a part of society, it is ostensibly 
the focal point of all vision and consciousness.262  
From a Marxian point of view one might ask, why does Debord talk about representations 
and images rather than ideologies and commodities? It is Debord's fundamental insight that 
representations and images are the basic forms of ideologies and commodities. They are basic and 
the most primitive forms because they correspond to the fundamental acts of consciousness, vision 
and observation. Not everyone acknowledges being implicated in commodity production and 
ideological control, but everyone engages in the actions of watching, looking, and seeing. Our 
difficulty in understanding the real subsumption of labor under capital is that we do not realize the 
power of vision. It is powerful because we constantly do it, but also because of its historical 
importance. As Debord says, “The most modern aspect of the spectacle is the most archaic.”263   
Diana Eck, in her book Darśan, talks about the religious significance of seeing, images and 
vision in ancient Hindu traditions.  
A common sight in India is a crowd of people gathered in the courtyard of 
a temple or at the doorway of a streetside shrine for darśan of the deity. 
Darśan means “seeing.” In the Hindu ritual tradition it refers especially to 
religious seeing, or the visual perception of the sacred. When Hindus go to 
a temple, they do not commonly say, “I am going to worship,” but rather, 
“I am going for darśan.” They go to “see” the image of the deity—be it 
Krsna or Durgā, Śiva or Visnu—present in the sanctum of the temple, and 
they go especially at those times of day when the image is most beautifully 
adorned with fresh flowers and when the curtain is drawn back so that the 
image is fully visible. The central act of Hindu worship, from the point of 
view of the lay person, is to stand in the presence of the deity and to behold 
the image with one’s own eyes, to see and be seen by the deity. Darśan is 
sometimes translated as the “auspicious sight” of the divine, and its 
importance in the Hindu ritual complex reminds us that for Hindus 
“worship” is not only a matter of prayers and offerings and the devotional 
disposition of the heart. Since, in the Hindu understanding, the deity is 
present in the image, the visual apprehension of the image is charged with 
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religious meaning. Beholding the image is an act of worship, and through 
the eyes one gains the blessings of the divine.264 
Representations and images are important to the Hindus not merely because they are figures and 
idols, but because those representations and images, as figures and idols, are the connecting point 
between the mundane and divine. Thus they have a reality of their own and the worshippers can 
have religious relations with them. When those images and idols are recreated, it is a recreation 
of the divine reality. However, since the images and representations are recreations of the divine, 
the only way that the worshipper can act towards them is by looking and watching. In this way, 
vision becomes a profound experience.  
This is precisely the process of commodity fetishism for Marx. The subject no longer 
sees his relations, even relations towards the divine, as natural, direct social relations between 
two entities (in these cases between the worshipper and the divine, the producer and his product.) 
The social nature or connective power of the relation manifests from the relation itself. Instead, 
in commodity fetishism, the social characteristic lies in another independent object as the 
mediator that brings together two separated entities. Hence, commodities, like representations 
and images, are already a different class of objects which themselves play a different kind of 
role.  
The mysterious character of the commodity-form reflects the social 
characteristics of men’s own labour as objective characteristics of the 
product of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these 
things.265 
And so for the worshipper, it is not the gods themselves that he fetishizes. He fetishizes the 
power of the representations and images that bring the divine to him. All that is left for him is 
simply look on.  
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The worlds of Unhappy Consciousness, political economy, and schizophrenia already 
contained within themselves spectacular components.  Unhappy Consciousness wants to achieve 
the same result by recreating its experience of the divine through relics and religious items. It is 
not a conscious experience but rather a sensational experience that is ultimately visual, because 
the goal of Unhappy Consciousness is to create a scene. “Its thinking as such is no more than the 
chaotic jingling of bells, or a mist of warm incense, a musical thinking that does not get as far as 
the Notion, which would be the sole immanent objective mode of thought.”266  
The political economists who conceive political economy and capitalism as laws, “the 
stable image of unstable appearance,”267 are also holding on to a spectacular view of reality. The 
political economists do not see that “Men are producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.—real, 
active men, as they are conditioned by a definitive development of their productive forces and of 
the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms.”268 But because the 
circumstances of reality are considered as eternal laws, they “appear upside-down as in a camera 
obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion 
of objects on the retina from their physical life process.”269  
 Schizophrenia, as defined by Elyn Saks, “entails a profound loss of connection to reality. 
It is often accompanied with delusions, which are fixed yet false beliefs—such as you have killed 
thousands of people—and hallucinations, which are false sensory perceptions—such as you just 
seen a man with a knife.”270 We can see that the delusions are representations and the 
hallucinations are images for the schizophrenic; delusions and hallucinations are what stand 
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between the schizophrenic and the real world beyond. Gabel's account of the schizophrenic’s 
experience with hallucinations showcases the fully spectacular nature of schizophrenia.  
The problem…of visual hallucinations in schizophrenia has often 
preoccupied the theorists. Arieti emphasizes in this connection that during 
sleep the most primitive senses come to the force. The tactile and olfactory 
sense are certainly more primitive than the visual sense…This is not the 
case in the hallucinatory state. Since the visual centres are then involved in 
a much more intense contribution than the auditory centres, the 
performance of the ‘sensory’ requirements of the deranged state would 
hence forth inhibit the latter. Schneider has suggested a similar 
explanation. Optical hallucinations appear in schizophrenia involving 
extreme intellectual deterioration (Bumke)…Schneider is also one of the 
first to insist on the similarities of schizophrenia…with the state of falling 
asleep.271 
As Debord puts it, “As long as necessity is socially dreamed, dreaming will remain necessary. 
The spectacle is the bad dream of a modern society in chains and ultimately expresses nothing 
more than its wish for sleep. The spectacle is the guardian of that sleep.”272 The person who has 
medical schizophrenia might be comparable to a narcoleptic who cannot help but fall asleep due 
to his condition. For the social schizophrenic, however, his sleep is self-induced. Sleep and 
dreams are his methods of escaping the real world.  
 One should then be careful to not make the mistake of assuming that only the 
schizophrenic experiences what we consider distortions of reality in the forms of delusions and 
hallucinations. As long as we have not yet reached dialectical and historical consciousness or not 
yet understand dependent origination, we, in some way, are just as delusional as the 
schizophrenic. Thich Nhat Hanh, a Buddhist Zen master, says in his book Understanding Our 
Mind, “We live in a universe filled with false images and delusions, yet we believe that we are 
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truly in touch with the world.”273 Unlike those who we identify as schizophrenics, those who 
experience hallucinations and delusions as episodes, we fail to notice our own delusions and 
hallucinations because, in actuality, they happen so frequently to us. “Most of our perception, 
longing, and aversion occur in the mode of representations or in the third mode of perception, the 
mode of mere images.”274 There is a reason why we cling onto representations and images— 
they provide us with what we want to see, which we mistake for real relations without 
confronting reality at all.  
When we fall in love, for example, we usually fall in love with an image we 
have of our beloved. We cannot eat, sleep, or do anything because this 
image in us is so strong. Our beloved is beautiful to us, but our image of 
him may actually be far from reality. We don’t realize that the object of our 
perception is not the reality-in-itself but an image we have created. After 
we marry and live with our beloved for two or three years, we realize that 
the image that we held on to and stayed awake at night thinking about was 
largely false…Our consciousness manifests an image of the object and we 
love that image. The image we love may have nothing to do with the 
person-in-himself. It is like taking a photograph of a photograph.275 
The lover is willing to hold on to the image of the beloved even though it is detrimental 
to his happiness. He clings to what he wants the beloved to be rather than who she really is. 
Similarly, we, as wage-laborer as a spectator, want to hold on to the image of capitalism as a 
self-valorized system. In the spectacle because capitalism and the spectacle present to us a reality 
that can bring about our desire for abstract autonomy and freedom. One aspires to make the 
image of capitalism a reality because then one can imagine that “as a free individual he can 
dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that, on the other hand, he has no other 
commodity for sale, i.e. he is rid them, he is free of all the objects needed for the realization of 
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his labour-power.”276 It is important not only to make capitalism a reality but an autonomous 
reality, because the more autonomous the sphere of circulation is the more one can realize one’s 
own autonomy. Not only is capitalism the sphere of abstract freedom but it is also what gives us 
the illusion of social human interactions without actually relating to and recognizing one another, 
since everything is already pre-determined under the real subsumption of labour under capital. At 
this stage, capitalism, conceived and actualized as the autonomous mediator, resolves its own 
contradiction and the contradiction that resides within its inhabitants.  
The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose 
boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very 
Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, 
Equality, Property, and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller 
of a commodity, let us say of labour-power, are determined only by their 
own free will. They contract, as free persons, who are equal before law. 
Their contract is the final result in which their joint will finds a common 
legal expression. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, 
as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for 
equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And 
Bentham, because each looks only to his own advantage. The only force 
bring them together, and putting them into relation with each other, is the 
selfishness, the gain and the private interest of each. Each pays heed to 
himself only, and no one worries about the others. And precisely for that 
reason, either in accordance with the pre-established harmony of things, or 
under the auspices of an omniscient providence, they all work together for 
their mutual advantage, for the common weal, and in the common 
interest.277 
What Marx describes capitalism as real subsumption is what Debord describes as the 
society of the spectacle. Their descriptions differ but fundamentally both describing the same 
phenomenon. Debord is saying that this phenomenon of coming together in separation happens 
not only within the sphere of circulation or commodity exchange. It is the ubiquitous reality of 
today’s society as the society of the spectacle. Just as ownership of commodities what keeps 
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people apart but also brings them together, in the world of the spectacle, being a spectator both 
joins people and keeps them apart. Standing in between them are spectacles.  
 The spectacle was born from the world’s loss of unity, and the immense 
expansion of the modern spectacle reveals the enormity of this loss. The 
abstractifying of all individual labor and the general abstractness of what 
is produced are perfectly reflected in the spectacle, whose manner of being 
concrete is precisely abstraction. In the spectacle, a part of the world 
represents itself to the world and is superior to it. The spectacle is simply 
the common language of this separation. Spectators are linked solely by 
their one-way relationship to the very center that keeps them isolated from 
each other. The spectacle thus reunites the separated, but it reunites them 
only in their separateness.278 
It is this phenomenon of the spectators encountering the spectacle and, through the 
spectacle, reflecting back into themselves is what turns the being of the spectators into what 
Hegel calls illusory being. “Illusory being is the same thing as reflection; but it is reflection as 
immediate. For illusory being that has withdrawn into itself and so is estranged from its 
immediacy, we have the foreign word refection.”279 The estrangement from immediacy faced by 
the illusory being is the estrangement of the spectator who is alienated from the spectacle even 
though it is immediate to him. “The spectator does not feel at home anywhere, because the 
spectacle is everywhere.”280 The dialectical movement or the movement of working 
consciousness also contains within it the moment of reflection but it can only come after the 
encounter with the other. In work, the other is immediate. For the consciousness of the illusory 
being and the spectator, the moment of reflection is what is immediate.  
The movement of consciousness as the Tao is one (abstract unity), two (coming out of 
itself), and three (the moment of return). The movement of the society of the spectacle, by 
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contrast, is one, three, and two. It is a movement that has been inverted. The spectator encounters 
the mediator, as images and representations first, which is merely its own reflection, before he can 
come into contact with the other. If being a spectator means consciousness is alienated from 
reality, then the spectacle is the reflection of consciousness’ alienation back on itself. “This 
reciprocal alienation is the essence and support of the existing society.”281 
To use the example of the lover again, when the lover looks at his beloved, he is not 
looking directly but through an image that he creates. Likewise, his beloved does the same thing 
by perceiving through an image that she creates. They also interact with each other through 
representations in the forms of judgments, doubts, and ideas about each other. Both are already 
engaging with each other as spectators and, by making images and judgments, they are already 
part of the production of spectacles. The spectacle already appears within personal and societal 
relations. Thus, Debord cautions us. “The spectacle cannot be understood as a mere visual excess 
produced by mass-media technologies. It is a worldview that has actually been materialized, that 
has become an objective reality.”282  
The whole sectors of the economy dedicated to the production of images and 
representations—the materialization process of spectacular society requires sectors dedicated to 
spectacular production. “In all of its particular manifestations — news, propaganda, advertising, 
entertainment — the spectacle is the model of the prevailing way of life.”283  A prominent 
example is the role that celebrities play in the society of the spectacle. Celebrities are images and 
representations of people and what their lives could be.  
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Stars — spectacular representations of living human beings — project this 
general banality into images of permitted roles. As specialists of apparent 
life, stars serve as superficial objects that people can identify with in order 
to compensate for the fragmented productive specializations that they 
actually live. The function of these celebrities is to act out various lifestyles 
or sociopolitical viewpoints in a full, totally free manner. They embody the 
inaccessible results of social labor by dramatizing the by-products of that 
labor which are magically projected above it as its ultimate goals: 
power and vacations — the decision-making and consumption that are at 
the beginning and the end of a process that is never questioned. On one 
hand, a governmental power may personalize itself as a pseudo-star; on 
the other, a star of consumption may campaign for recognition as a 
pseudo-power over life. But the activities of these stars are not really free 
and they offer no real choices.284 
The real danger, however, is that, within the world of spectacular capitalism, anything 
can be turned into a spectacle. Events of everyday life, if the purpose is to put up an appearance, 
can become spectacles.  
The concept of “the spectacle” interrelates and explains a wide range of 
seemingly unconnected phenomena. The apparent diversities and contrasts 
of these phenomena stem from the social organization of appearances, 
whose essential nature must itself be recognized. Considered in its own 
terms, the spectacle is an affirmation of appearances and an identification 
of all human social life with appearances.285  
A spectacle can be what wear, how we speak, the things we own, and so on. The 
worldview that we can connect with others by impressing people, by showcasing oneself, by 
making ourselves appear great in people’s eyes is what the spectacle is really about. Within 
spectacular society, reality is not determined by direct relations but how we appear to one 
another. When Marx speaks of the power of money, he is speaking of money as basic to the 
spectacle.  
Being the external, common medium and faculty for turning an image 
into reality and reality into a mere image (a faculty no springing from 
                                                            
284 Ibid, Section 60.  
285 Ibid, Section 10.  
  80
man as man or from human society as society), money transforms the 
real essential powers of man and nature into what are merely abstract 
conceits and therefore imperfections—into tormenting chimeras—just as 
is transforms real imperfections and chimeras—essential powers which 
are really important, which exist only in the imagination of the 
individual—into real powers and faculties.  
Money, then, appears as this overturning power both against the 
individual and against the bonds of society, etc., which claim to be essences 
in themselves. It transforms fidelity into infidelity, love into hate, hate into 
love, virtue into vice, vice into virtue, servant into master, master into 
servant, idiocy into intelligence and intelligence into idiocy.286    
Debord also talks about the true function of money as more than just an instrument for exchange. 
As the basis for the spectacle, it can transform life itself.   
The spectacle is the flip side of money. It, too, is an abstract general 
equivalent of all commodities. But whereas money has dominated society 
as the representation of universal equivalence — the exchangeability of 
different goods whose uses remain uncomparable — the spectacle is the 
modern complement of money: a representation of the commodity world as 
a whole which serves as a general equivalent for what the entire society 
can be and can do. The spectacle is money one can only look at, because in 
it all use has already been exchanged for the totality of abstract 
representation. The spectacle is not just a servant of pseudo-use, it is 
already in itself a pseudo-use of life.287 
Hence lies, falsehoods, and untruths form the foundation of the society of the spectacle and its 
spectators. “In a world that has really been turned upside down, the true is a moment of the 
false.”288 It gets to the point where we rely on the spectacle not so much because we are afraid to 
be genuine and authentic. Rather, it is because the spectacle is the one and only reality, and there 
are no other realities to compete against it. We are so used to lying that we no longer know the 
truth.  
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Ultimately, it is within our own lives where the presence of capitalism and the spectacle 
is directly felt but habitually ignored. The willingness to submit oneself to spectacular tendencies 
is the unwillingness to relate to, depend on, and recognize others. Socially, we are spectators. 
Individually, we live in secrecy and isolation. “Generalised secrecy stands behind the spectacle, 
as the decisive complement of all it displays and, in the last analysis, as its most vital 
operation.”289 We cannot bear to expose ourselves, to be vulnerable, and to open ourselves to 
others. Living in secrecy does not necessarily mean that we have secrets to keep, but is telling of 
our incapacity to relate to each other because we do not want to risk the comfort of autonomous 
existence. When human lives become the sphere of secrecy, the spectacle becomes the place of 
revelation, the realm of up-to-date information, the latest news, and exposed secrets. Therefore, 
nothing is revealed, “news of what is genuinely important, of what is changing, comes rarely, 
and then in fits and starts,”290 and yet it feels like nothing is hidden. There are no further reasons 
to know and learn more about others outside of our pre-constructed spectacular reality consisting 
of images and representations. “Sitting in the car next to our spouse, we complete ignore her 
because we think that we already know everything about her and that there is nothing interesting 
to learn about her anymore.”291  
Since we no longer see the need for other people, what complements the life of secrecy is 
the life of isolation. Despite the façade of globalization and community of the current age, likely 
in no other historical period humans as lonely as we are now. Even in the case of the lover and 
his beloved, when two people are face to face, they may not recognize one another. Although we 
have to admit that the failure to achieve mutual recognition is a natural tendency of self-
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consciousness, a tendency of human beings in general, spectacular capitalism turns this tendency 
into actuality. Capitalism and the society of the spectacle is where disregarding others is not only 
viable but also encouraged. It is the mutual interest of the master of labor, the wage-laborer and 
spectators alike to maintain this isolation to eliminate contradictions and crises which may 
threaten the smooth operation of society and interactions between individuals.  
The reigning economic system is a vicious circle of isolation. Its 
technologies are based on isolation, and they contribute to that same 
isolation. From automobiles to television, the goods that the spectacular 
system chooses to produce also serve it as weapons for constantly 
reinforcing the conditions that engender “lonely crowds.” With ever-
increasing concreteness the spectacle recreates its own presuppositions.292 
This deep sense of loneliness and isolation, far from being the natural condition of humans as 
social beings, is a result of our choices and actions in regard to how we view our own 
relationships with other people. “This relation has no basis in natural history, nor does it have a 
social basis common to all periods of human history. It is clearly the result of a past historical 
development, the product of many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a whole series of 
older formations of social production.”293 The world seems hostile to us because we are hostile to 
the world. As a result, “Though separated from what they produce, people nevertheless produce 
every detail of their world with ever-increasing power. They thus also find themselves 
increasingly separated from that world. The closer their life comes to being their own creation, 
the more they are excluded from that life.”294 
 When what we have created is a world that can only be looked at, there is no longer a 
need to work in order to realize one’s dialectical understanding of reality. Work is no longer seen 
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as “the eternal natural condition of human existence…The process of labour is nothing but work 
itself, viewed at the moment of its creative activity.”295 It is the notion of work as creative 
activity that we have lost and forgotten. “What we are confronted by here is the alienation of 
man from his own labour.”296 The loss of work is experienced by both the laborer and the 
capitalist. For the laborer, the fact that he has to sell his own labor-power signifies the loss of the 
real existence of the world and himself. The wage-laborer is simply absorbed under “the 
commands of capital.”297 Likewise, the master of labor, as the agent of capital, has given up his 
capacity to work and merely becomes an instrument for capital. “And in fact it is no more than 
the rationalized motive and aim of the hoarder—a highly impoverished and abstract content 
which makes it plain that the capitalist is just as enslaved by the relationships of capitalism as is 
his opposite pole, the worker, albeit in a quite different manner.”298 Both the wage-laborer and 
the capitalist, in their submission to capitalism, are identical to Unhappy Consciousness when it 
surrenders its own ability to self-create through work to the priest.  
In the mediator, then, this consciousness frees itself from action and 
enjoyment so far as they are regarded as its own. As a separate, 
independent extreme, it rejects the essence of its own will, and casts upon 
the mediator or minister [priest] its own freedom of decision, and herewith 
the responsibility for its own action. This mediator, having a direct 
relationship with unchangeable Being, ministers by giving advice on what 
is right. The action, since it follows upon the decision of someone else, 
ceases, as regards the doing or the willing of it, to be its own. But there is 
still left to the unessential consciousness the objective aspect, viz. the fruit 
of its labour, and its enjoyment. These, therefore, it rejects as well, and just 
as it renounces its will, so it renounces the actuality it received in work and 
enjoyment.299   
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Instead of work, capitalism and the society of the spectacle is the epitome of non-work. 
Hence the law of capitalism is “Productivity of labour in general = the maximum of profit with 
the minimum work.”300 Commodities and images achieve their autonomy respectively in the 
form of capital and spectacle. The laborer realizes his complete autonomy as a consumer or part 
of the leisure class. “The consistent upholders of the mistaken theory that surplus-value has its 
origin in a nominal rise of prices or in the privilege which the seller has of selling too dear 
assume therefore that there exists a class of buyers who do not sell, i.e. a class of consumers who 
do not produce.”301  
The spectator’s work is not to work. As a non-worker, his entire existence revolves 
around the aversion to work which only adds to his imagined notion of autonomy. “Its alien 
character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, 
labour is shunned like the plague.”302 Work is not something people want to do, as a natural 
activity of life, but it becomes something that people feel like they are forced to do because 
creative labor is now estranged, or wage-labor. “The worker therefore only feels himself outside 
of his work, and in his work feels outside himself. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but 
coerced; it is forced labour.”303 The assumption is the less work one has to do, the less one can 
actually be productive on things that matter such as go on vacations, take up a hobby, or just 
relax.  
Due to the very success of this separate production of separation, the 
fundamental experience that in earlier societies was associated with 
people’s primary work is in the process of being replaced (in sectors near 
the cutting edge of the system’s evolution) by an identification of life with 
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nonworking time, with inactivity. But such inactivity is in no way liberated 
from productive activity. It remains dependent on it, in an uneasy and 
admiring submission to the requirements and consequences of the 
production system. It is itself one of the products of that system. There can 
be no freedom apart from activity, and within the spectacle activity is 
nullified — all real activity having been forcibly channeled into the global 
construction of the spectacle. Thus, what is referred to as a “liberation 
from work,” namely the modern increase in leisure time, is neither a 
liberation within work itself nor a liberation from the world shaped by this 
kind of work. None of the activity stolen through work can be regained by 
submitting to what that work has produced.304 
When we identify our life with nonworking time and inactivity, we get caught into this 
paradox that Debord mentions above. We have to work more in order for us not to work. This is 
the opposite of the non-action mindset which is not doing so one can do everything—the non-
worker does everything to do nothing. “A general working rule of the integrated spectacle, at 
least for those who manage its affairs, is that, everything which can be done, must be done.”305 
For average wage-laborers, the goal is commonly to find a stable job and to earn enough money 
so that, when they are satisfied with the amount of wealth that they possess, they can then enjoy 
their leisure in whatever forms they can conceive them in. But that is not the case. Since labor-
power is the only thing that the laborer has that is worthwhile for a capitalistic society, the wage-
laborer is never paid enough to actually get out of the workforce. The wage-laborer is paid just 
enough only for subsistence, minimum-wage, so he can continue his existence as a wage-laborer 
and the source of surplus-value for capital.  
The cost of production of simple labour power, therefore amounts to the 
cost of existence and reproduction of the worker. The price of this cost of 
existence and reproduction constitutes wages. Wages so determined are 
called the wage minimum. This wage minimum, like the determination of 
the price of commodities by the cost of production in general, does not hold 
good for the single individual but for the species. Individual workers, 
millions of workers, do not get enough to be able to exist and reproduce 
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themselves; but the wages of the whole working class level down, within 
their fluctuations, to this minimum.306 
But the ideal of the non-working life, the life of leisure, is still at the forefront for the wage-
laborer. Leisure, not necessarily pleasure, as a way to way to escape his alienation, dangles in 
front of his face like a carrot in front of a mule. For that reason, the wage-laborer keeps returning 
to the capitalist and sells his labor-power hoping that one day he can overcome his alienated 
condition. Being a consumer and part of the leisure class does not necessarily mean that one is a 
seeker of pleasure. Rather, it points back to an abstract need of self-consciousness to be in a 
permanent state of communion with itself. Even the wage-laborer who really is working—in 
order to keep himself alive—is nonetheless fundamentally motivated by the desire for autonomy.   
 It is also the rejection of work that a capitalist is a capitalist and the reason for why he 
seeks out wage-laborers.  That is why other commodities do not interest the capitalist as much as 
labor-power. “…by incorporating living labour into their lifeless objectivity, the capitalist 
simultaneously transforms value, i.e. past labour in its objectified and lifeless form, into capital, 
value which can perform its own valorization process, an animated monster which begins to 
‘work’, ‘as it its body were by love possessed’.”307 His job is to fine-tune capital so it can run 
more efficiently and making sure that his capital is productive at all time. The capitalist thinks 
that the more he invests into his capital, the less he himself has to work and all he has to do is to 
watch the capital valorizes itself. In the capitalist’s eyes, capital is something that is alive, “It 
brings forth living offspring, or at least lays golden eggs.”308 Capital is the capitalist’s relief from 
the world and the promised return to autonomy. “Only then will he be relieved of the need to 
work directly himself and be content with himself as the capitalist, i.e., as supervisor and 
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director of the process, as a mere function, as it were, endowed with consciousness and will, of 
the capital engaged in the process of valorizing itself.”309 That is why he has to be certain that 
capital is constantly running and producing by feeding more labor-power to this seemingly living 
entity.  
...and the capitalist, who exists only as a potential purchaser of labour, 
becomes a real capitalist only when the worker, who can be turned into a 
wage-labourer only through the sale of his capacity for labour, really does 
submit to the commands of capital. The functions fulfilled by the capitalist 
are no more than the functions of capital—viz. the valorization of value by 
absorbing living labour—executed consciously and willingly. The capitalist 
functions only as personified capital, capital as a person. 310  
The wage-laborer and the capitalist share the mentality of non-work. Both sides really 
want to escape the world and return to the state of autonomy. Yet, this creates a vicious cycle 
that keeps them both sides trapped within the world. Because of the desire for leisure, or the 
sphere of abstract autonomy, the laborer turns his labor-power into a commodity for sale and 
exchanges it for wage. In turn, the capitalist, whose instinctive task is to keep capital running, 
always has access to a readily available reserve of wage-laborers which only serves to pulls the 
capitalist back to the task of acquiring additional labor-power. That is why Marx makes the 
comparison between the capitalist and the hoarder. The capitalist, like the hoarder, has an 
irresistible impulse to accumulate. The hoarder searches for value while the capitalist’s interests 
lie in surplus-value. Both cases resemble showing candy to a child. The child cannot help but 
wants it. Under capitalism, the wage-laborer and the capitalist keep each other in chains.  
The wage-laborer and the capitalist are polar opposites of each other but, in the end, since 
they both shared the ideal of non-work, the direction they are both heading is the same which is 
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towards a highly technological and automated world. “Automation…the most advanced sector of 
modern industry and the epitome of its practice.”311 For capital to be an autonomous, self-
valorized entity is for it to be automatic and to run itself without external inputs. The real 
subsumption of labor under capital brings about the need to turn anything into “an automaton…a 
moving power that move itself.”312 As such, the machine represents the pinnacle of all that is 
automatic. “The means of labour passes through different metamorphoses, whose culmination is 
the machine, or rather, an automatic system of machinery (system of machinery: the automatic 
one is merely its most complete, most adequate form, and alone transforms into a system).”313  
The machine, as a form, is not to be viewed merely as a mechanical object but things that 
are automatic and made so that they have self-moving power. If images and representations are 
the primitive forms of the spectacle, then the machine form is the most advanced. When one is 
looking at an image or cognizing a representation, it is only an aspect of oneself that is reflected. 
For example, an image of his lover reflects something about his love life or the representation of 
democracy reflects something about his political stance. But the spectacle of the machine is the 
reflection of the spectator’s own humanity, his capacity for work, and, therefore, everything 
about him. In the presence of the system of machinery, it is absolutely spectacular because there 
is nothing left to add or take away. The spectator’s humanity, his being as a worker, is already 
right there in front of him.  
In no way does the machine appear as the individual worker's means of 
labour. Its distinguishing characteristic is not in the least, as with the 
means of labour, to transmit the worker's activity to the object; this 
activity, rather, is posited in such a way that it merely transmits the 
machine's work, the machine's action, on to the raw material — supervises 
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it and guards against interruptions. Not as with the [693] instrument, 
which the worker animates and makes into his organ with his skill and 
strength, and whose handling therefore depends on his virtuosity. Rather, it 
is the machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the worker, is 
itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting 
through it; and it consumes coal, oil etc. (matières instrumentales), just as 
the worker consumes food, to keep up its perpetual motion. The worker's 
activity, reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is determined and 
regulated on all sides by the movement of the machinery, and not the 
opposite. The science which compels the inanimate limbs of the machinery, 
by their construction, to act purposefully, as an automaton, does not exist 
in the worker's consciousness, but rather acts upon him through the 
machine as an alien power, as the power of the machine itself.314 
 With the machine, as the embodiment of non-work in place of work, the contradictions 
that were faced by Unhappy Consciousness (immediate and beyond), the wage-laborer (personal 
and social), and of the schizophrenic (reality and fantasy) in the sphere of Life are now resolved 
through inversion, from the sphere of life to the sphere of death represented by the system of 
machinery. “Capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only sucking living labour and 
lives the more, the more labour it sucks.”315 Capitalism and the society of the spectacle, as the 
inversion of life into death, is, in truth, the inversion of the entire world.  
According, then, to the law of this inverted world, what is like in the first 
world is unlike to itself, and what is unlike in the first world equally unlike 
to itself, or it becomes like itself. Expressed in determinate moments, this 
means that what in the law of the first world is sweet, in this inverted in-
itself is sour, what in the former is black is, in the other, white. What in the 
law of the first in the north pole of the magnet is, in its other, supersensible 
in-itself [viz. in the earth], the south pole; but what is there south pole here 
is north pole. Similarly, what in the first law is the oxygen pole of 
electricity becomes in its other, supersensible essence, hydrogen pole; and 
conversely, what is there the hydrogen pole becomes here the oxygen pole. 
In another sphere, revenge on an enemy is, according to immediate law, 
the supreme satisfaction of the injured individuality. This law, however, 
which bids me confront him as himself a person who does not treat me as 
such, and in fact bids me destroy him as an individuality—this law is 
turned round by the principle of the other world into its opposite: the 
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reinstatement of myself as a person through the destruction of the alien 
individuality is turned into self-destruction. If, now, this inversion, which 
finds expression in the punishment of the crime, is made into a law, it, too, 
again is only the law of one world which is confronted by an inverted 
supersensible world where what is despised in the former is honoured, and 
what in the former is honoured, meets with contempt. The punishment 
which under the law of the first world disgraces and destroys a man, is 
transformed in its inverted world into the pardon which preserves his 
essential being and brings him to honour.316 
 It seems like when Hegel describes the idea of the inverted world, he seems to be taking a 
theoretical approach in order to get us to understand the movement of the dialectic, as the 
interdependent relations between opposites. The inverted world described in the passage above is 
still within the realm of possibility. But now that we have arrived at the real subsumption of 
labour under capital in the society of the spectacle, the inverted world is now the actual world. 
Everything for the wage-laborer has been turned upside down. “Hence the rule of the capitalist 
over the worker is the rule of things over man, of dead labour over living labour, of the product 
over the producer.”317 Likewise, the spectator who can no longer differentiate between what is 
true and what is false. “The spectacle presents itself as a vast inaccessible reality that can never 
be questioned. Its sole message is: “What appears is good; what is good appears.” The passive 
acceptance it demands is already effectively imposed by its monopoly of appearances, its manner 
of appearing without allowing any reply.”318 The spectator does not even have to do anything. To 
act, even to think in a dialectical way, is discouraged if not prohibited.  
The flow of images carries everything before it, and it is similarly someone 
else who controls at will this simplified summary of the sensible world; 
who decides where the flow will lead as well as the rhythm of what should 
be shown, like some perpetual, arbitrary surprise, leaving no time for 
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reflection, and entirely independent of what the spectator might understand 
or think of it.319 
To live is to live in passivity, in non-work, in secrecy and isolation. Even if the world right now 
appears to us as chaotic, unstable, and full of activities, they are merely illusions of the flow of 
images and the circulation of commodities which are supported by an underlying lifelessness. It 
is the dream of life imagined by those who are asleep.  
 If to continue living is to be passive and embrace death, the repudiation of life now 
becomes a sign of vitality. The schizophrenic, who cannot bear to continue to rely on the 
crutches of drugs, treatments, therapies, psychologists, psychiatrists, who understands that those 
things can give him a life but a life that is a lie, the only course of action he feels like he can take 
is to commit suicide.  
There are fine but important distinctions between wanting to be dead, 
wanting to die, and wanting to kill yourself. Most people have from time to 
time wished to be dead, null, beyond sorrow…many want to die, to 
undertake the active changes from where they are, to be freed from the 
affliction of consciousness. To want to kill yourself, however, requires a 
whole extra level of passion and a certain directed violence. Suicide is not 
the result of passivity; it is the result of an action taken. It requires a great 
deal of energy and a strong will in addition to a belief in the permanence of 
the present bad moment and at least a touch of impulsively.320 
It is not a moment of cowardice but it is the need to take action and suicide is the only action left 
that can be taken. This is not only for the schizophrenic but for all consciousnesses in general. 
Hegel says in the Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, “In this element of the will is rooted in my 
ability to free myself from everything, abandon every aim, abstract from everything. The human 
being alone can sacrifice everything, his life included; he can commit suicide.”321 Suicide is not 
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something that one should do since it is still motivated by the false desire for autonomy but, in 
the inverted world, it may appear the only thing that one can do as a way to hold on to this active 
and, to a certain extent, creative independence. The only other option is to retreat back into 
passivity and be content with abstract self-certainty, a step back for consciousness.  
It is the same for the capitalistic and spectacular society, it still exists because it embraces 
dead labor and the ideals of the system of machinery. But, when society actually does something, 
when it decides to be active, it is always something that will eventually lead to its own death. 
Such is the case for every aspects of society including politics and even the sciences.  
Generalised secrecy stands behind the spectacle, as the decisive 
complement of all it displays and, in the last analysis, as its most vital 
operation.  
The simple fact of being unanswerable has given what is false an 
entirely new quality. At a stroke it is truth which has almost everywhere 
ceased to exist or, at best, has been reduced to the status of pure 
hypothesis. Unanswerable lies have succeeded in eliminating public 
opinion, which first lost the ability to make itself heard and then very 
quickly dissolved altogether. This evidently has significant consequences 
for politics, the applied sciences, the legal system and the arts.322 
This is not necessarily a result of malicious intent but the natural outcome of a series of decisions 
supported by our own ignorance. And, true to what Hegel says about the inverted world, 
ultimately, both individuals and society are building a world that is waiting to self-destruct.  
The manufacture of a present where fashion itself, from clothes to music, 
has come to a halt, which wants to forget the past and no longer seems to   
believe in a future, is achieved by the ceaseless circularity of information, 
always returning to the same short list of trivialities, passionately 
proclaimed as major discoveries. Meanwhile news of what is genuinely 
important, of what is actually changing, comes rarely, and then in fits and 
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starts. It always concerns this world’s apparent condemnation of its own 
existence, the stages in its programmed self-destruction.323 
 Because of the fact that to act fast now would only quickens the process of self-destruction. 
Debord warns, “A critique seeking to go beyond the spectacle must know how to wait.”324 And it is 
this willingness to wait, the capacity for patience, is how we can invert this inversion and helps us 
to overcome self-destruction which, if allowed to continue, seems inevitable. However, patience is 
what the Tao Te Ching advocates in times of turmoil and chaos, when the water is murky and 
unclear. One must wait until the murkiness settles down and the water itself will become clear. 
When things are cleared, we know what to do. Patience and the ability to wait is the topic for the 
next chapter. 
Who can wait quietly while the mud settles? 
Who can remain still until the moment of action? 
Observers of the Tao do not seek fulfilment. 
Not seeking fulfillment, they are not swayed by desire for change.325 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
323 Ibid, Section 5.  
324 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, Section 220.  
325 Feng, Tao Te Ching, Chapter 15. 
  94
Chapter 3: Infinity and Patience   
 
So, bhikkhus, if Sakka, lord of the devas, subsisting on the fruit of his own merit, exercising 
supreme sovereignty and rulership over the Tāvatiṃsa devas, will be one who speaks in praise of 
patience and gentleness, then how much more would it be fitting here for you, who have gone 
forth in such a well-expounded Dhamma and Discipline, to be patient and gentle.  
(SN 11.4)  
 
 In chapter 2, we determined that spectacular and capitalistic society is a world that is in 
the process of inverting, turning inside out. The I-Ching (The Classic of Changes) portrays this 
movement as the transition from hexagram 11 (Prosperity) to hexagram 12 (Obstruction).   
 
 
 
The descriptions and the symbols of the hexagrams provide us with judgements that are both 
appropriate and relevant to our actual experience of the world. Looking at hexagram 11, when 
the world is prosperous, harmonious, and peaceful, people work together and depend on one 
another. Wang Bi’s commentary on the I Ching emphasizes that peace and harmony are based on 
mutual, interdependent relationships between different members of society.  
When one pulls the rush plant, it pulls up other of the same kind together 
with it, so if one goes forth and acts, there will be good fortune. {The rush 
plant is such that when one pulls it up by its roots, it pulls up others 
connected to it. The word ru [pull up] refers to the way things get pulled up 
together. Here the three yang [connected] lines share the same aim, for all 
have fixed it on the outer [upper] trigram. The first line is the leader of its 
kind, so when it initiates, so when it initiates action, the others follow, just 
like the rush plants that get pulled up together. The lines of the upper 
Hexagram 11 (Prosperity) Hexagram 12 (Obstruction)
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trigram respond compliantly and do not become disobedient or contrary, 
so when the yang lines advance, all of them achieve their purpose. This is 
why to go forth and act here with others of the same kind means that “there 
will be good fortune.”}326 
The inversion of hexagram 11 is hexagram 12, which might be taken to symbolize the inverted 
world of the spectacular and capitalistic society. The opposite, or inverted, world of hexagram 12 
is filled with corruption, instability and conflicts. Where hexagram 11 shows how members of 
society depend and rely upon one another to establish harmony and peace, hexagram 12 says that 
what is rotten at the core is the separation of people and things from one another.   
Heaven and Earth do not interact: this is the image of Obstruction. In the 
same way, the noble man holds back the practice of his virtue and thus 
avoids disaster. He must not allow himself to be honored with rank and 
salary.327 
 But neither the state of prosperity nor the state of obstruction are permanent. The 
transition between prosperity and obstruction, since they are the inverse of one another, is like a 
pendulum swing. When the pendulum reaches the highest point, it returns to the other side by its 
own momentum. This applies to every phenomenon in the world. All things are impermanent 
and constantly changing.  
The Master said: “To get into danger is a matter of thinking one’s position 
secure; to become ruined is a matter of thinking one’s continuance 
protected; to fall into disorder is a matter of thinking one’s order enduring. 
Therefore the noble man when secure does not forget danger, when 
enjoying continuance does not forget ruin, when maintaining order does 
not forget disorder. This is the way his person is kept secure and his state 
remains protected. The Changes say: ‘This might be lost, this might be lost, 
so tie it to a healthy, flourishing mulberry.’”328 
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When the fool is in the position of prosperity, he assumes that prosperity will last forever, and 
the same when he faces hardships. By contrast, the wise man understands that reality is always 
changing and moving, and lives life accordingly.  
 It is important to keep in mind the impermanent nature of things in order to recognize the 
impermanence of capitalism itself. Marx says that capitalism at its advanced stage occupies a 
unique place in the development of history. Under capitalism’s real subsumption, work and labor 
are not merely dominated by capital but revolutionized and transformed by it. “This [formal 
subsumption] stands in striking contrast to the development of a specifically capitalist mode of 
production (large-scale industry, etc.) [real subsumption]; the latter not only transforms the 
situations of the various agents of production, it also revolutionizes their actual mode of labour 
and the real nature of the labour process as a whole.”329 Spectacular capitalism is a particular and 
hence specific phase of history. It is recent in comparison to the whole of history; it is therefore 
difficult to compare with what came before, and to predict what will come after. Nonetheless, 
being a moment of history, it is subject to change.  
Spectacular capitalism seems permanent, impervious to the constantly changing world. It 
is new and recent and yet familiar enough to appear as common sense. Whether one is for or 
against capitalism, the consensus is that spectacular capitalism is here to stay. It presents itself as 
invulnerable and infallible, free from challenges and oppositions. Since spectacular capitalism is 
our own creation, to believe that it is permanent and cannot change or be changed is self-
deception. This illusion of permanence enables spectacular capitalism to not only survive but to 
eliminate any opposition.  
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The spectacle is a permanent opium war designed to force people to equate 
goods with commodities and to equate satisfaction with a survival that 
expands according to its own laws. Consumable survival must constantly 
expand because it never ceases to include privation. If augmented survival 
never comes to a resolution, if there is no point where it might stop 
expanding, this is because it is itself stuck in the realm of privation. It may 
gild poverty, but it cannot transcend it.330 
If spectacular capitalism appears permanent it is not because it has truly transcended history and 
the effects of time. Spectacular capitalism transforms our own perception of history and time.  
The spectacle, considered as the reigning society’s method for paralyzing 
history and memory and for suppressing any history based on historical 
time, represents a false consciousness of time.331 
In actuality, however, it is more accurate to say that we ourselves change our views of 
time and history in order to accommodate our perceptions of spectacular capitalism as an 
autonomous, self-valorized system. We change ourselves from dialectical, historical, and 
dependent beings to autonomous, ahistorical, and isolated entities in conformity with spectacular 
capitalism.  Thus, we view capitalism as permanent. However, Debord shows that man’s relation 
to nature and others is fundamentally historical.  
Man, “the negative being who is solely to the extent that he suppresses 
being,” is identical with time. Man’s appropriation of his own nature is at 
the same time his grasp of the development of the universe. “History is 
itself a real part of natural history, of the transformation of nature into 
man” (Marx). Conversely, this “natural history” exists effectively only 
through the process of human history, the only vantage point from which 
one can take in that historical totality, like the modern telescope whose 
power enables us to look back in time at the receding nebulas at the 
periphery of the universe.332 
In other words, it is the dialectical process of working consciousness transforming reality and, in 
turn, being transformed by it that makes history, the experience of time and being human. “The 
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natural basis of time, the concrete experience of its passage, becomes human and social by 
existing for humanity.”333 Working consciousness needs to “live the historical time that it 
produces” and, in turn, it “discovers the simple, unforgettable core of its revolutionary project; 
and each previously defeated attempt to carry out this project represents a possible point of 
departure for a new historical life.”334 We to have accept and live with the consequences of our 
actions; for us, this is spectacular capitalism. Although spectacular capitalism seems alienating 
and out of reach, it is our creation. “Though separated from what they produce, people 
nevertheless produce every detail of their world with ever-increasing power. They thus also find 
themselves increasingly separated from that world. The closer their life comes to being their own 
creation, the more they are excluded from that life.”335  
Because we produce spectacular capitalism we can change it. However, when we work 
unconsciously to actualize spectacular capitalism as an autonomous and self-moving reality, 
spectacular capitalism, in turn, actualizes us as non-historical beings. As spectators, we deny our 
responsibility for creating it, even as we respond with “an uneasy and admiring submission to the 
requirements and consequences of the production system.”336 As a result, spectacular capitalism 
appears to have a monopoly over history and time. “This devalued time is the complete opposite 
of time as “terrain of human development.”337 It is the terrain of non-work for consciousness, 
and the appearance of work for capital and the spectacle. Spectacular capitalism asserts that there 
is no time and history outside of capital and the spectacle, that time and history is on its side. 
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There is no time but “time spent consuming images” and in “the consumption of time”338 itself. 
It follows that there cannot be anything, including humanity, outside of spectacular capitalism. 
Because history and time, for Marx and Debord, constitute human nature, and since spectacular 
capitalism would monopolize history and time, to venture outside the spectacle seems like 
suicide. We view history through the prism of spectacular capitalism rather than seeing 
spectacular capitalism as historical.  
As a result, even though spectacular capitalism is damaging to us, it appears inescapable. 
If the autonomy of the commodity furnishes the inner world of spectacular experience, its 
contents, then the distortion of history and time is its outer boundary. We cannot escape 
spectacular capitalism through spectacular means. The only way out that the spectacle offers 
denies our historical nature. It has conditioned us to think we are not responsible for our reality 
and makes us suppose that we can never participate in it. Many who acknowledge problems with 
capitalism and the spectacle would escape into realms such as literature, music, and religion as 
safe havens that transcend the corruptions of life. The outlets need not be spectacular, but they 
become so when they are viewed unhistorically. “What is presented as true life turns out to be 
merely a more truly spectacular life.”339 They can become spectacular means of retreat for those 
who have given up.  
Others would even feign to attack the spectacle from a place of security, as spectators. 
“The end of the history of culture manifests itself in two opposing forms: the project of culture’s 
self-transcendence within total history, and its preservation as a dead object for spectacular 
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contemplation.”340 History and time can only be “portrayed, like all spectacular commodities, at 
a distance.”341 We create the spectacle as our object of contemplation. Debord sees this tendency 
in the arts, especially with avant garde movements. We might think of the arts and artists as 
models of creativity, opposed to spectacular passivity. This is not necessarily the case. 
Spectacular contemplation presents the illusion of revolution.  
Dadaism and Surrealism were the two currents that marked the end of 
modern art. Though they were only partially conscious of it, they were 
contemporaries of the last great offensive of the revolutionary proletarian 
movement, and the defeat of that movement, which left them trapped within 
the very artistic sphere whose decrepitude they had denounced, was the 
fundamental reason for their immobilization. Dadaism and Surrealism were 
historically linked yet also opposed to each other. This opposition involved 
the most important and radical contributions of the two movements, but it 
also revealed the internal inadequacy of their one-sided critiques. Dadaism 
sought to abolish art without realizing it; Surrealism sought to realize art 
without abolishing it.342 
Followers of the avant garde see themselves as counter-cultural and standing outside of the 
prevailing culture. So, for the avant garde, the outcomes are twofold. It can be self-elimination 
like Dadaism, which “sought to abolish art without realizing it”–it opposed spectacular 
capitalism by ineffectually removing itself. Conversely, Surrealism “sought to realize art without 
abolishing it.” Although it professed to go against the status-quo, it often did so by following the 
rules of spectacular capitalism. The avant garde’s overcoming is like a game. They would either 
win the game by refusing to play, or by playing, ratify the spectacle. The illusion of revolt leads 
artists to vainglorious complacency.  
Art in its period of dissolution — a movement of negation striving for its 
own transcendence within a historical society where history is not yet 
directly lived — is at once an art of change and the purest expression of the 
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impossibility of change. The more grandiose its pretensions, the further 
from its grasp is its true fulfillment. This art is necessarily avant-garde, 
and at the same time it does not actually exist. Its vanguard is its own 
disappearance.343 
 Art is not the only case. For Marx philosophy is a prime example of this self-defeating and 
hypocritical tendency. Philosophers, like avant garde artists, imagine themselves changing and 
transforming the world while remaining within the comfort of their own thoughts, concepts, and 
theories.  
  Since the Young Hegelians consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in 
fact all the products of consciousness, to which they attribute an 
independent existence, as the real chains of men (just as the Old Hegelians 
declared them the true bonds of human society) it is evident that the Young 
Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of consciousness. Since, 
according to their fantasy, the relationships of men, all their doings, their 
chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, the Young 
Hegelians logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their 
present consciousness for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and 
thus of removing their limitations. This demand to change consciousness 
amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, i.e. to recognise it 
by means of another interpretation. The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in 
spite of their allegedly “world-shattering" statements, are the staunchest 
conservatives. The most recent of them have found the correct expression 
for their activity when they declare they are only fighting against 
“phrases.” They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are 
only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the 
real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this 
world. The only results which this philosophic criticism could achieve were 
a few (and at that thoroughly one-sided) elucidations of Christianity from 
the point of view of religious history; all the rest of their assertions are 
only further embellishments of their claim to have furnished, in these 
unimportant elucidations, discoveries of universal importance. 
It has not occurred to any one of these philosophers to inquire into the 
connection of German philosophy with German reality, the relation of their 
criticism to their own material surroundings.344 
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Debord adds a contemporary coda. “The spectacle does not realize philosophy, it philosophizes 
reality, reducing everyone’s concrete life to a universe of speculation.”345 
Avant garde artists and philosophers, like all spectators, remove themselves from history 
and time. We accept the permanence of the way things are, refusing to live with the historical 
time that we produce. The only apparent escapes from the spectacle are its ever more radical 
manifestations. The spectacle and capital inevitably increase our separation. Frontal assault only 
strengthens the spectacle and its hold on us. It is like pulling out the rug that we are standing on. 
Spectacular capitalism only grows; it does not hide from such assaults but actually welcomes 
them. “The critical concept of “the spectacle” can also undoubtedly be turned into one more 
hollow formula of sociologico-political rhetoric used to explain and denounce everything in the 
abstract, thus serving to reinforce the spectacular system.”346  
It seems we are left with no place to go from here. We have reached an impasse. What 
emancipation is possible when spectacular capitalism has transformed the way we understand 
change itself or, in other words, our perception of history and time? It culminates in our rejection 
of ourselves as historical and temporal beings. That is why revolutions, as catalysts for change, 
fail. To revolt without critically and practically embodying the nature of change is for revolution 
to undermine itself and become its own worst enemy. “Revolutionary theory is now the enemy of 
all revolutionary ideology, and it knows it.”347 Being critical is more than just making criticisms 
and pointing out flaws. Often when we are too engrossed in criticism, we cannot move forward. 
Marx sees his contemporaries as confined to merely intellectual criticism.  
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The Young-Hegelian ideologists, in spite of their allegedly “world-
shattering" statements, are the staunchest conservatives. The most recent of 
them have found the correct expression for their activity when they declare 
they are only fighting against “phrases.” They forget, however, that to 
these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that 
they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely 
combating the phrases of this world.348 
Work as critical activity is more than just an occupation with immediate problems; it is precisely 
the capacity to see alternatives to the current situation that is basic to critique. In conjunction 
with the critical aspect of work, the practical aspect of work is the process of bringing our visions 
into actuality. Only when these two aspects of work, critique and practice, are understood as 
integral to one another can we understand what Marx means when he says work, as practical-
critical activity, is creative. That is why a discussion of history and time is necessary—not only 
because it might help us understand the paradoxical phenomenon we are facing, where the more 
we try to escape spectacular capitalism the stronger it gets, but also because it might help us see 
a possibility for change and understand how to bring it about.  
The Buddha teaches that nature has three marks:  
Non-self [anatta], meaning there is no independent, autonomous self that we can identify 
ourselves or others with.  
At Sāvatthī. Sitting to one side, the Venerable Rādha said to the Blessed 
One: “Venerable sir, it is said, ‘nonself, nonself.’ What now, venerable sir, 
is nonself?”  
“Form, Rādha, is nonself, feeling is nonself, perception is nonself, 
volitional formations are nonself, consciousness is nonself. Seeing 
thus…He understands:’…there is no more for this state of being.’”349   
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Suffering or dissatisfaction [dukkha], meaning that there is nothing that one can cling to 
or desire;  
“Form, Rādha, is suffering, feeling is suffering, perception is suffering, 
volitional formations are suffering, consciousness is suffering. Seeing 
thus…He understands:’…there is no more for this state of being.’”350   
Impermanence [anicca], meaning everything is subject to change.  
“Form, Rādha, is impermanent. Feeling…Perception…Volitional 
formations…Consciousness is impermanent. Seeing thus…He 
understands:’…there is no more for this state of being.’”351   
Anything that exists or might exist has to possess these three characteristics. By 
recognizing the three marks of existence, one is said to have insight into the true nature of 
reality.  
The spectacle, as the inversion of the true or the mere appearance and illusion of truth, 
poses itself as the inversion of the three marks of existence. First, the spectacle, like capital, 
appears as an independent and autonomous entity, having an intrinsic self.  
The images detached from every aspect of life merge into a common stream 
in which the unity of that life can no longer be recovered. Fragmented 
views of reality regroup themselves into a new unity as a separate pseudo-
world that can only be looked at. The specialization of images of the world 
has culminated in a world of autonomized images where even the deceivers 
are deceived. The spectacle is a concrete inversion of life, an autonomous 
movement of the nonliving. 352 
Second, the spectacle is to be accumulated.  
 In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, life is 
presented as an immense accumulation of spectacles.353 
Third, the spectacle appears permanent and eternally present. It is time that does not change.  
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The time of production — commodified time — is an infinite accumulation 
of equivalent intervals. It is irreversible time made abstract, in which each 
segment need only demonstrate by the clock its purely quantitative equality 
with all the others. It has no reality apart from its exchangeability. Under 
the social reign of commodified time, “time is everything, man is nothing; 
he is at most the carcass of time” (The Poverty of Philosophy). This 
devalued time is the complete opposite of time as “terrain of human 
development.”354 
With the first and second characteristics, spectacular capitalism appears to assert itself as 
the natural master of reality. Not just the spectacle, but anything that we view as autonomous and 
desirable will naturally come to dominate us. Buddhism recognizes this in the case of the 
ignorant person who does not realize that pleasures and pains result from his own actions, but 
supposes they are external realities to get rid of or chase after. 
“Bhikkhus, when the uninstructed worldling is being contacted by a 
painful feeling, he sorrows, grieves, and laments; he weeps beating his 
breast and becomes distraught…” 
“Being contacted by that same painful feeling, he harbours aversion 
towards it. When he harbours aversion towards painful feeling, the 
underlying tendency to aversion towards feeling lies behind this. Being 
contacted by painful feeling, he seeks delight in sensual pleasure. For what 
reason? Because the uninstructed worldling does know of any escape from 
pain feeling other than sensual pleasure, the underlying tendency to lust for 
pleasant feeling lies behind this…”355 
As spectators we also lack agency, while seeking the autonomy promised by the spectacle. So we 
submit to it, unaware that it is our own construction; the spectacle, our own creation, holds us in 
bondage. The producer becomes the product, the master becomes the slave.  “The triumph of this 
separation-based economic system proletarianizes the whole world.”356 It is this ignorance of the 
fact that we are enslaving ourselves even though we could be free which is at the heart of 
suffering. “Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is 
on the one hand furnished with natural powers of life—he is an active natural being…On the 
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other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and 
limited creature…”357 We impose on ourselves those limitations and conditions, hence they are 
real and actual. But because we are active and working creatures, those limitations and 
conditions are never fixed. We are capable of alienation and inhumanity but we are also capable 
of liberation and humanity. To be human is not something that is given and can be taken for 
granted. We always have to work for it.   
 Thus the third characteristic of spectacular capitalism, its pretension to permanence, is the 
most harmful. It affirms suffering, alienation and inhumanity as natural and therefore permanent 
in our lives. The problems deepen when we take what is inhuman to be naturally human. At a 
personal level, when we are exposed long enough to anything, we begin to identify with it as part 
of our natural identity. We cannot imagine ourselves otherwise. Such things appear natural not 
because they are actually the way things are, whether good or bad, but because of our 
identification with them.  
“These eight worldly conditions, monks, keep the world turning around, 
and the world turns around these eight worldly conditions. What eight? 
Gain and loss, fame and disrepute, praise and blame, pleasure and pain. 
“When an uninstructed worldling, monks, comes upon gain, he does not 
reflect on it thus: ‘This gain has come to me is impermanent, bound up with 
suffering, subject to change.’ He does not know it as it really is. And when 
he comes upon loss, fame and disrepute, praise and blame, pleasure and 
pain keep his mind engrossed. When gain comes he is elated and when he 
meets with loss he is dejected. When fame comes is elated and when he 
meets with disrepute he is dejected. When praise comes he is elated and 
when he meets with blame he is dejected. When he experiences pleasure he 
is elated and when he experiences pain he is dejected. Being thus involved 
in likes and dislikes, he will not be freed from birth, aging, and death. 
From sorrow, lamentation, pain, dejection, and despair; he will not be 
freed from suffering, I say.”358  
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On a historical level, Cyril Smith describes what it means to view spectacular capitalism 
as natural life. “The fact that we go on living inhumanly shows that we look at the world in ways 
which make this inhumanity seem somehow ‘natural’ and inevitable.”359 This is a crucial 
component for spectacular capitalism because “it serves as a necessary pseudo-justification for a 
counterfeit life.”360 John Welwood, in his book Toward a Psychology of Awakening, discusses 
how a person under psychological distress maintains and perpetuates her problem by 
constructing stories as a means for justification, instead of trying to improve her condition.  
One of the main ways we try to hold our identity together is by developing 
an elaborate web of rationalizations—stories about the way we are or the 
way reality is—to justify our denial and avoidance. A story in this sense is 
a mental interpretation of our experience, a way of organizing our beliefs 
into an overall view of reality. Such stories may not be entirely conscious. 
Often they are more like dreams, consisting of subconscious imaginings 
and expectations.  
For example, a woman whose father had been remote in childhood had 
difficulty acknowledging her need for emotional contact. She justified her 
rejection of this need through a story she told herself: “Men are not 
emotionally available. Since you can never trust them, it would be foolish 
to ever let myself need a man.” When this woman was in a relationship, she 
would contract against her own need and hold herself back because she 
never wanted to be in such a vulnerable position again. As a result, men 
would always leave her because they couldn’t feel a real connection with 
her. And this reinforced her story, “You can never count on men to be 
there.”361  
In the same vein, for spectators, the existence of spectacular capitalism requires its own story. 
The narrative of spectacular capitalism must presents itself as the natural realization of humanity 
and the truth of what it means to be human.  
The economy’s triumph as an independent power at the same time spells its 
own doom, because the forces it has unleashed have eliminated 
the economic necessity that was the unchanging basis of earlier societies. 
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Replacing that necessity with a necessity for boundless economic 
development can only mean replacing the satisfaction of primary human 
needs (now scarcely met) with an incessant fabrication of pseudo-needs, all 
of which ultimately come down to the single pseudo-need of maintaining 
the reign of the autonomous economy. But that economy loses all 
connection with authentic needs insofar as it emerges from the social 
unconscious that unknowingly depended on it. 362 
  To make itself appear natural, spectacular capitalism represents time in two ways. “The 
limitations of human practice imposed by the various stages of labor have humanized time and 
also dehumanized it, in the forms of cyclical time and of the separated irreversible time of 
economic production.”363 These two ways of looking at time existed before spectacular 
capitalism. More traditional societies, such as China and Egypt, exemplified cyclical or eternal 
time. In China and Egypt, the masters of history “long held a monopoly on the immortality of the 
soul.”364 In Greece, irreversible or historical time, time as movement, emerges out of the cyclical 
realm of myth. “Historical time became conscious in Greece.”365 Cyclical and historical time 
coexist in the Middle Ages. “The Middle Ages, an incomplete mythical world whose 
consummation lay outside itself, is the period when cyclical time, though still governing the 
major part of production, really begins to be undermined by history.”366 The monotheistic 
religions of the Middle Ages are semihistorical.  
The monotheistic religions were a compromise between myth and history, 
between the cyclical time that still governed the sphere of production and 
the irreversible time that was the theater of conflicts and regroupings 
among different peoples. The religions that evolved out of Judaism were 
abstract universal acknowledgments of an irreversible time that had 
become democratized and open to all, but only in the realm of illusion. 
Time is totally oriented toward a single final event: “The Kingdom of God 
is coming soon.” These religions were rooted in the soil of history, but they 
remained radically opposed to history. The semihistorical religions 
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establish a qualitative point of departure in time (the birth of Christ, the 
flight of Mohammed), but their irreversible time — introducing an 
accumulation that would take the form of conquest in Islam and of 
increasing capital in Reformation Christianity — is inverted in religious 
thought and becomes a sort of countdown: waiting for time to run out 
before the Last Judgment and the advent of the other, true world. Eternity 
has emerged from cyclical time, as something beyond it. It is also the 
element that restrains the irreversibility of time, suppressing history within 
history itself by positioning itself on the other side of irreversible time as a 
pure point into which cyclical time returns and disappears. Bossuet will 
still say: “By way of time, which passes, we enter eternity, which does not 
pass.”367 
Like the monotheistic religions, spectacular capitalism combines irreversible and cyclical 
time. On the one hand it needs a narrative of irreversible progress leading to the appearance of 
spectacular capitalism. Spectacular capitalism has “to inspire the continued progression of that 
time by recording the past out of which it has developed.”368 It must appear as a natural outcome 
of the long and arduous course of history, so that it does not appear as something imposed or 
forced. The spectacle presents itself as the triumph of progress. “The owners of history have 
given time a direction, a direction which is also a meaning.”369  
This meaning is the second aspect of the spectacular narrative. Spectacular capitalism 
must have a direction that is not arbitrary. That is why, besides appearing as a linear progression, 
it must also appear cyclical. This cyclical appearance makes it possible to suppose that, 
notwithstanding the various modes of production and social relations throughout history, the 
underlying essence of those forms was always spectacular and capitalistic. “In itself, cyclical 
time is a time without conflict.”370 Spectacular capitalism has to appear cyclical so as not to 
conflict with modes of production and social relations that existed before it. The message is that 
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spectacular capitalism was right there all along. Spectacular capitalism appears not an arbitrary 
presence but a necessary one.  
When we put irreversible time and cyclical time together, the narrative of spectacular 
capitalism is complete. However, the spectacle takes a step further. Spectacular time is not 
semihistorical like the monotheistic religions, but pseudocyclical. “The general time of human 
nondevelopment also has a complementary aspect—a consumable form of time based on the 
present mode of production and manifesting itself in everyday life as a pseudocyclical time.”371 
Spectacular time is not the movement towards the end of history like monotheistic religions but 
it is the end of history that is in movement. As the inversion of semihistorical time, it is time that 
is seen as no longer historical. “Spectacular domination’s first priority was to eradicate historical 
knowledge in general; beginning with just about all rational information and commentary on the 
most recent past.”372 The result is a narrative that already established the spectacle as the 
permanent end of history, and everything else serves to justify that fact. In other words, the 
spectacle goes beyond the semihistorical time of monotheistic religions by seemingly going 
beyond narrative and story altogether. The spectacle needs no justification because it asserts 
itself as fact.  
The precious advantage which the spectacle has acquired through the 
outlawing of history, from having driven the recent past into hiding, and 
from having made everyone forget the spirit of history within society, is 
above all the ability to cover its own tracks -- to conceal the very progress 
of its recent world conquest. Its power already seems familiar, as if it had 
always been there. All usurpers have shared this aim: to make us forget 
that they have only just arrived.373 
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 For the semihistorical time of monotheistic religions, the end of history is the result of a 
historical movement and so it still requires a story or a myth to justify this reaching for the end. 
In pseudocyclical time, the end of history is at the beginning of the movement; thus its emphasis 
on the cyclical rather than the historical emphasis of semihistorical time. The conclusion comes 
at the beginning, not at the end. Spectacular time is consumable time, time as identical to our acts 
of consumption and of non-work. Consumption comes before work and labor. Spectacular time 
does not need a justification; it is the realm where we do need to wait to get into spectacular 
paradise. It is something that we experience now and not something to wait for like the Kingdom 
of God. The spectacle is the gate that can instantaneously transport us to the realm of enjoyment 
and consumption  
Spectacular capitalism is “an eternal present” where one can “forget the past”374 and 
never worry about the future. This is the logic of spectacular capitalism. The spectacle cannot be 
questioned, it “compels universal respect; it is no longer permitted to laugh at it.”375 The 
spectacle is not imposed by overt violence. In China and the Soviet Union, emperors and 
dictators tried to overtly control history.  
How drastically any absolute power will suppress history depends on the 
extent of its imperious interests or obligations, and especially on its 
practical capacity to execute its aims. Ts’in Che Hoang Ti had books 
burned, but he never managed to get rid of all of them. In our own century 
Stalin went further, yet despite the various accomplices he managed to find 
outside his empire’s borders, there remained a vast area of the world 
beyond the reach of his police, where his schemes could be ridiculed.376 
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Despots could be ridiculed, but mockery cannot touch the spectacle.  “In any case, it has become 
impossible to show that one is laughing.”377 We do not question the spectacle because we never 
question our communion with ourselves as consumers, and so we never question it.  
 Underneath the cyclical appearance, history still moves though spectators are oblivious. 
History moves not as an extension of our own development, a movement reflecting our own 
movement. History subsumed under spectacular capitalism is merely the description of events 
happening to autonomous things and individuals on the newspaper or the television. History and 
time are viewed as absolutely external to the spectators themselves. It belongs not to our lives, 
but to archives. History originates in the chronicle. “The chronicle is the expression of the 
irreversible time of power.”378 The medieval chronicles give way to the accumulation of big data. 
History is archived and stored-up, separate from the lives of spectators and their engagement 
with consumable time. Archiving allows “the forgetting of whatever has nonetheless been 
understood”379 and history is something never to be bothered with again. Since history is hidden 
in the background, the spectacle appears to precede narratives and stories. Archived history 
becomes information to be controlled. This is how we deal with history within spectacular 
capitalism, and in so doing strengthen the spectacle.  
One aspect of the disappearance of all objective historical knowledge can 
be seen in the way that individual reputations have become malleable and 
alterable at will by those who control all information: information which is 
gathered and also -- an entirely different matter -- information which is 
broadcast. Their ability to falsify is thus unlimited. Historical evidence 
which the spectacle does not need to know ceases to be evidence.380 
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Information or archived history must be falsified and manipulated repeatedly. 
Pseudocyclical time is not like the semhistorical monotheistic religions where one grand 
narrative or myth served as a unitary justification. Pseudocyclial time incessantly demands new 
narratives or myths as falsified information and self-deception. But even though new myths are 
constantly created, it is the same spectacular message every time, “the ceaseless circularity of 
information, always returning to the same short list of trivialities, passionately proclaimed as 
major discoveries.”381 Consequently, within the spectacle myths and narratives are not merely 
part of the religious or political sphere; every aspect of life is mythical. “The integrated 
spectacle… has spread itself to the point where it now permeates all reality.”382 Therefore, the 
experience of pseudocyclical time is not a continuous, uninterrupted movement, as it appears on 
the surface. In actuality, the spectacle is a sequence of fragments and divided parts that happen 
over and over again because we repeatedly reproduce the spectacle only to return to it.  
These commodified moments are explicitly presented as moments of real 
life, whose cyclical return we are supposed to look forward to. But all that 
is really happening is that the spectacle is displaying and reproducing itself 
at a higher level of intensity.383 
In the Science of Logic, Hegel calls this the one-sided infinity. “The progress to infinity 
is, consequently, only the perpetual repetition of one and the same content, one and the same 
tedious alternation…”384 This sense of repetition promotes the illusion that spectacular 
capitalism is permanent. This is its maddening power, but it is also a sign of its fragility. Even 
though pseudocyclial time, posing as a natural fact, denies any narrative as the source of its 
origin, it always has to provide a new narrative every time it reproduces itself as “the promise of 
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some new disillusion to come.”385 The spectacle must always give an explanation why we need 
the next best thing.  
The prestigiousness of mediocre objects of this kind is solely due to the fact 
that they have been placed, however briefly, at the center of social life and 
hailed as a revelation of the unfathomable purposes of production. But the 
object that was prestigious in the spectacle becomes mundane as soon as it 
is taken home by its consumer — at the same time as by all its other 
consumers. Too late it reveals its essential poverty, a poverty that 
inevitably reflects the poverty of its production. Meanwhile, some other 
object is already replacing it as justification of the system and demanding 
its own moment of acclaim. 
 Spectacular capitalism is not simply a world that lacks development and change; these 
occur outside of the spectators’ view. As consumers—the seekers of leisure— spectators are 
mesmerized by constant repetition. We retreat to the realm of consumption while the spectacular 
world—technology and information—becomes increasingly complex and sophisticated. What 
grows, develops, and improves is not the consumers of technologies and information, but the 
spectacle itself. This recalls what Marx says about capitalism.  
…the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more 
value he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes; the 
better formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the 
more civilized his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the 
mightier labor becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker; the more 
ingenious labor becomes, the duller becomes the worker. 386  
Under spectacular capitalism, this predicament pertains not only to laborers but to all, including 
the masters of labor—the capitalists. The growth of the commodity comes at the expense of 
human development. In pseudocyclical time people become idiots and cretins, while capital as 
the spectacle expands and grows stronger. We do not grow as human beings. This situation is 
similar to the experience of the lord in the Phenomenology. The lord is not aware that the world 
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outside him is constantly changing and fleeting. But because he is obsessed with his own sense 
of self through his repeated enjoyments, he is oblivious to the changing world. “Desire has 
reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby its unalloyed feeling of self. But that 
is the reason why this satisfaction is itself only a fleeting one, for it lacks the side of objectivity 
and permanence.”387 With spectacular capitalism, universal proletarianization also means 
universal embourgeoisement—we would maintain our own ignorance of this changing reality.  
As spectators, dwelling in the realm of consumption, we are ignorant of the intrinsic 
instability of our own reality. We forget the fact that, even though spectacular capitalism seems 
permanent, it is an illusion of permanence that is underlined by constant self-repairing. The 
spectacle is the appearance of a stable structure that is supported by a shaky foundation that is 
always at the verge of collapse. The logic of the spectacle undermines itself. 
The things the spectacle presents as eternal are based on change, and must 
change as their foundations change. The spectacle is totally dogmatic, yet 
it is incapable at arriving at any really solid dogma. Nothing stands still 
for it. This instability is the spectacle’s natural condition, but it is 
completely contrary to its natural inclination.388  
The existence of the spectacle is merely momentary, consisting of nothing but the latest, most 
up-to-date trends. Accordingly, in the realm of spectacular capitalism, everything is short-lived 
and nothing is truly long lasting.  This is especially true of human relationships, whose duration 
becomes increasingly fragile. As a result, in order for the spectacle to preserve its longevity, it 
actually requires constant technological innovations in order to provide new solutions to its ever 
increasing problems; “the integrated spectacle is characterized by… incessant technological 
renewal.”389 Constant technological renewal is necessary to conceal the instability and 
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fleetingness of the spectacle. The transition between each short-lived spectacular moment, from 
one trend to the next, from one latest news to the next, and so on, must be quick and 
instantaneous. Technology in the form of media makes this possible.  
When social significance is attributed only to what is immediate, and to 
what will be immediate immediately afterwards, always replacing another, 
identical, immediacy, it can be seen that the uses of the media guarantee a 
kind of eternity of noisy insignificance.390 
The more the media is developed the more concealed the transition between each repetition at 
the rate of “increasing transportation speeds.”391 The speed from one spectacular moment to the 
next increases to the point that time can no longer be perceived as a movement that keeps getting 
faster. What arrives is a pre-constructed package. “In its most advanced sectors, concentrated 
capitalism is increasingly tending to market “fully equipped” blocks of time, each functioning as 
a unified commodity combining a variety of other commodities.”392  
Everything arrives in front of me ready-made, like Netflix movies, YouTube videos. Not 
just entertainments but any products that would require time to create come to us in no time at 
all. There cannot be a gap from one moment of gratification to the next. My desires must be met 
instantaneously and time itself becomes a commodity. “The time based on commodity 
production is itself a consumable commodity.”393 Time is a commodity to be purchased and what 
we are paying for is more illusions of real life. We pay to experience what it feels like to be 
living rather than actually experiencing life.  
In the expanding economy of “services” and leisure activities, the payment 
for these blocks of time is equally unified: “everything’s included,” 
whether it is a matter of spectacular living environments, touristic pseudo-
travel, subscriptions to cultural consumption, or even the sale of sociability 
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itself in the form of “exciting conversations” and “meetings with 
celebrities.” Spectacular commodities of this type, which would obviously 
never sell were it not for the increasing impoverishment of the realities they 
parody, just as obviously reflect the modernization of sales techniques by 
being payable on credit.394 
However, the transition is never quick enough to completely eliminate the irritation of 
dissatisfaction. Consciousness never actually experiences the feeling of an unalloyed self; the 
perpetual search for instant gratification always goes along with feelings of agitation, despair, 
anxiety and restlessness.  
He regards feeling thus…perception thus…volitional formation 
thus…consciousness thus: ‘This is mine, this I am, this my self.’ That 
consciousness of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of 
consciousness, there arise in him sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, 
and despair.”395 
This impatience is the essence of the spectator, who does not see time as change but as 
consumable. We want our demands to be met immediately and we cannot wait.  
This impatience itself provides a clue to how to overcome the spectacle. In its place, 
patience is the capacity to make and give time for consciousness “to impose its own 
condition”396 instead of being drawn into the spectacle. It is the acknowledgment that we make 
history when we live historically. Once we learn to wait and realize that history happens right 
where we are, we do not have to chase after the next moment of consumption, getting caught in 
the endless repetitions of commodified time. Time is a social relation, the lived experience of 
individuals in movement and not some external commodity waiting to be acquired or even 
bought.  
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Waiting, for Laozi and Debord, is not simply biding one’s time in the expectation that 
change will come automatically. Patience is precisely the removal of all such expectations and 
letting change come naturally. Change can only occur when all the conditions are present. Where 
there is smoke there is fire; the spectacle can only disappear when we ourselves are no longer 
spectators. The capacity to wait might seem like passivity but it is actually the genuine spirit of 
revolution. We overcome the spectacle by overcoming our own spectacular tendencies. By 
changing ourselves, we change our spectacular reality rather than dismissing it.  
Knowing others is wisdom; 
Knowing the self is enlightenment. 
Mastering others requires force; 
Mastering the self needs strength. 
 
He who knows he has enough is rich. 
Perseverance is a sign of willpower. 
He who stays where he is endures. 
To die but not to perish is to be eternally present.397 
 
Through patience, we are aware of our own agitation, restlessness, and despair. We begin 
to realize how fragile and impermanent the system of spectacular capitalism really is. This 
inherent weakness is easily missed in the midst of incessant grasping, when we try too hard to 
accomplish and enjoy too many things. In patience we begin our departure from the spectacle by 
making time to start asking questions about the status of spectacular capitalism and, in turn, our 
own current way of living. We can then see the spectacle for what it is instead of creating new 
myths and stories to conceal it. Precisely because it is so fragile, spectacular capitalism must 
present an image of permanence, and constantly reinforce itself to make sure it does not collapse. 
We unconsciously become this reinforcement when we chase our desires. The spectacle thrives 
on the anxiety and restlessness of impatient spectators.  
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As we become aware of the spectacle’s hold on our lives, we may become impatient to 
do away with it. This urge to overcome the spectacle is dangerous because it is not really 
motivated by rejection of the spectacle. It may be secretly driven by envy of the power of the 
spectacle. “Spectacular power can similarly deny whatever it likes, once, or three times over, and 
change the subject, knowing full well there is no danger of any riposte, in its own space or any 
other.”398 The spectacle was begotten by power; it cannot be overpowered by overt attacks. “The 
root of the spectacle is that oldest of all social specializations, the specialization of power.”399 
Historically, Marxists fell into this trap. While critical of the power of capital and the state, they 
sought to wield power themselves.  
A ‘Marxist’ theory of politics went along with this mechanical view, 
according to which the individuals who make up the ruling class are 
determined to defend their interests against those they exploit, and are 
ready to use violent means where necessary. The state was then said to be 
‘nothing but’ their instrument for this purpose. ‘Revolution’ simply meant 
smashing up this instrument, and establishing a new one, just changing the 
form of state power. ‘Socialism’, largely identified with state ownership, 
was the next ‘mode of production’ on a pre-set historical agenda. The 
conception of revolution flourishing in Marxist circles thus centred, not on 
the idea of liberation, but on the concept of power.400 
Those who desire spectacular power want to empty the throne of the spectacle only to take its 
place. In spectacular capitalism, power is wielded by experts, specialists, “academics and media 
professionals, sociologists and police.”401 They occupy the highest rung of the spectacular 
hierarchy because they have the authority over everything spectacular. The spectacle speaks for 
everyone. “It is hierarchical society’s ambassador to itself, delivering its messages at a court 
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where no one else is allowed to speak.”402 However, spectacular reality is never what it seems. 
“All experts serve the state and the media and only in that way do they achieve their status.”403 
 Within the spectacle, time is no longer seen as the realm of change and growth. 
Pseudocyclical or commodified time is when change and growth cease. This problem manifests 
in our relationships with things and people. They becomes all or nothing. Either things go our 
way or we react with indifference at best or hostility at worst. We lack the time to observe or 
listen or have dialogues with others. We never give others enough time for them to open 
themselves to us. “The primary cause of the decadence of contemporary thought evidently lies in 
the fact that spectacular discourse leaves no room for any reply.”404 How can there be reply when 
there is not enough time for the other to find the words to speak his mind? We already silence 
others when we are impatient. “Conversation is almost dead, and soon so too will be those who 
knew how to speak."405 This is even more apparent in our efforts to help others. In trying to help 
without patience, without making and giving time for others, we betray the secret conviction that 
those we are trying to help cannot really change. We draw a boundary between ourselves as 
helpers and those who needing help. We lack confidence in their ability to help themselves. Such 
activism, though it styles itself revolutionary, defies Marx’s conviction that the revolution will be 
the work of the workers themselves. The activist considers himself the representative of the 
exploited class. He “forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to 
educate the educator himself” and activism “must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one 
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of which is superior to society.406 A covert lust for power may lead to the creation of theories, 
movements, and sectarian groups. 
‘Marxism’ was an attempt to set up a philosophical doctrine, a philosophy 
of history, which would explain how society made transitions from one 
stage to another. This misunderstanding obscured what was crucial for 
everything Marx did: the necessity for social consciousness to break out of 
its existing, fetishised forms to the level necessary for communism. This 
was not a matter of replacing one way of thinking with another, for it 
implied what Marx called ‘the alteration of humans on a mass scale’. [2] 
Instead of this understanding of the revolutionary transformation of 
humanity, ‘Marxism’ set up a system of thinking which assigns to special 
people - radical philosophers, or social scientists, or economists, or the 
Marxist Party - the task of ‘interpreting the world in various ways’ on 
behalf of the rest of us. In a quite separate operation, their conclusions 
could then be communicated to the benighted masses.407 
If we cannot be patient with others we cannot be patient with ourselves. Just as we want 
others to change instantly, we also want ourselves and our circumstances to immediately adjust 
to our expectations. “We place conditions on ourselves and our experience: “If I feel like this, 
there must be something wrong with me…I can only accept myself if my experience conforms to 
my standard of how it should be.”408 An example is when we seek out spiritual practices as 
guarantees for the quickest change in the shortest amount of time. Such spiritual practices will 
not only fail to free us from spectacular tendencies, but will only add to them.   
Spiritual practice involves freeing consciousness from its entanglement in 
form, matter, emotions, personality, and social conditioning. In a society 
like ours, where the whole earthly foundation is weak to begin with, it is 
tempting to use spirituality as a way of trying to rise above this shaky 
ground. In this way, spirituality becomes just another way of rejecting 
one’s experience. When people use spiritual practice to compensate for low 
self-esteem, social alienation, or emotional problems, they corrupt the 
nature of spiritual practice… 
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Spiritual bypassing is a strong temptation in times like ours when achieving 
what were once ordinary developmental landmarks—earning a livelihood 
through dignified, meaningful work; raising a family; sustaining a long-
term intimate relationship; belonging to a larger social community—has 
become increasingly difficult and elusive. Yet when people use spirituality 
to cover up their difficulties with functioning in the modern world, their 
spiritual practices remains in a separate compartment, unintegrated with 
the rest of life 
…people who hid behind a schizoid defense (resorting to isolation and 
withdrawal because the interpersonal realm feels threatening) often use 
teachings about detachment and renunciation to rationalize their aloofness, 
impersonality, and disengagement, when what they really need is to 
become more fully embodied, more engaged with themselves, with others, 
and with life. 409 
Patience not only exposes the weakness of spectacular capitalism; it is the basis for 
growth and change—our path to reclaim history and time.  
“People who strive continuously / 
will certainly attain what they seek. 
Having attained the benefits they sought, / 
practicing patience is supreme.”410 
We restore the natural flow of time from commodified blocks of time to real living moments of 
individuals.   
The revolutionary project of a classless society, of an all-embracing 
historical life, implies the withering away of the social measurement of 
time in favor of a federation of independent times — a federation of playful 
individual and collective forms of irreversible time that are simultaneously 
present. This would be the temporal realization of authentic communism, 
which “abolishes everything that exists independently of individuals.”411  
This sense of being present is not derived from getting what we want immediately but the 
immediacy of being present with living. We make time to develop relationships that are 
beneficial to our development and growth. On the one hand, with patience, we understand how 
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unnatural it is to demand that things be immediate and instantaneous. When time is 
commodified, as repetitive and pseudocyclical, real change is impossible in this unnatural and 
illusory realm of permanence. The spectacle changes but the spectators do not.  
The unavoidable biological limitations of the work force — evident both in 
its dependence on the natural cycle of sleeping and waking and in the 
debilitating effects of irreversible time over each individual’s lifetime — 
are treated by the modern production system as strictly secondary 
considerations. As such, they are ignored in that system’s official 
proclamations and in the consumable trophies that embody its relentless 
triumphant progress. Fixated on the delusory center around which his 
world seems to move, the spectator no longer experiences life as a journey 
toward fulfillment and toward death. Once he has given up on really living, 
he can no longer acknowledge his own death. Life insurance ads merely 
insinuate that he may be guilty of dying without having provided for the 
smooth continuation of the system following the resultant economic loss, 
while the promoters of the “American way of death” stress his capacity to 
preserve most of the appearances of life in his post-mortem state. On all 
the other fronts of advertising bombardment it is strictly forbidden to grow 
old. Everybody is urged to economize on their “youth-capital,” though 
such capital, however carefully managed, has little prospect of attaining 
the durable and cumulative properties of financial capital. This social 
absence of death coincides with the social absence of life.412 
On the other hand, with patience we also begin to see how natural growth and change 
actually occur. The I-Ching observes that actual change and growth unfold themselves slowly 
and gradually rather than instantly.  
A family that accumulates goodness will be sure to have an excess of 
blessing, but one that accumulates evil will be sure to have an excess of 
disasters. When a subject kills his lord or a son kills his father, it is never 
because of what happens between the morning and evening of the same day 
but because of something that has been building up for a long time and that 
should have been dealt with early—but it was not.413 
Therefore, real work and real change cannot happen instantaneously but must take time. 
Without this awareness we would retreat back to spectacular capitalism and the struggle for 
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power promising the instant gratification of quick results. Quick results are illusory since they 
are not our own doing. Shortcuts and quick results are defining features of the society of the 
spectacle.  
The image of blissful social unification through consumption merely 
postpones the consumer’s awareness of the actual divisions until his next 
disillusionment with some particular commodity. Each new product is 
ceremoniously acclaimed as a unique creation offering a dramatic shortcut 
to the promised land of total consummation.414 
So the only way we can escape spectacular capitalism while not resorting to “illusory 
escapes”415 is to resist the temptation of demanding immediate results. Quick solutions come to 
us, as Debord says, ready-made, reflecting our craving for commodified, pseudocyclical time. 
Even the desire to rapidly abolish and destroy the enemy, within spectacular capitalism, only 
makes it stronger. The thought of an enemy is the product our own paranoia and delusion which 
leads society as a whole to construct “its own inconceivable foe, terrorism. “416 This paranoiac 
mistrust fails to see that the worst enemies are ourselves—humans acting inhumanly towards one 
another. As the spectacle develops, it is easier for us to think that we are surrounded by unknown 
enemies and that we are living in a terrifying world. “The spectators must certainly never know 
everything about terrorism, but they must always know enough to convince them that, compared 
with terrorism, everything else must be acceptable, or in any case more rational and 
democratic.”417 This is only another myth to reestablish ourselves as spectators instead of 
realizing that we have no true human enemies at all.  
When we stop seeing people as enemies, the goal of overcoming spectacular capitalism is 
not to eliminate or convert anyone. We cannot force anyone else to change or be different; when 
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we ourselves have not changed the ways in which we act and when we force others to act that is 
not real change. “We surely know today, and should have known before, that nobody can be 
forced to be free, or driven to become human. To think otherwise is to have a distorted notion of 
what it means to be human.”418 The distorted notion here is thinking that people can change 
instantly. Hence, for Marx, the communist revolution, or simply working towards a human 
community, is not something that can be accomplished overnight.  
Clearly, Marx does not consider revolution as a sudden overnight 
transformation, resulting from some kind of coup d’état, however violent it 
might be. He refers to the situation following a prolonged historical 
transition, when ‘in the course of development class distinctions have 
disappeared and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a 
vast association of the whole nation.’ [504] Then, he anticipates, ‘the 
public power will lose its political character’. The proletariat will have 
‘abolished its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois 
society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an 
association in which the free development of each is the condition for the 
free development of all.’ [506]419 
Like the social transition into communism, for the Buddha, the individual’s path towards 
enlightenment is a journey that goes beyond one lifetime. It is a journey that spans uncountable 
lifetimes and forms. It is a movement that is infinite, and culminates in the boundless.  
‘And he, with mind concentrated…applies and directs his mind to the 
knowledge of previous existences: one birth, two, three, four, five births, 
ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty births, a hundred, a thousand, a hundred 
thousand births, several periods of contraction, of expansion, of both 
contraction and expansion.  “There my name was so-and-so, my clan was 
so-and-so, my caste was so-and-so, my food was such-and-such, I 
experienced such-and-such pleasant and painful conditions, I lived for so 
long. Having passed away from there, I rose there. There me name was so-
and-so…And having passed away from there, I arose here.”420 
                                                            
418 Smith, Marx at the Millennium, 73.  
419 Ibid, 32.  
420 Walshe, Digha Nikaya, 106.  
  126
It is not an infinity of one-sided repetitions or one-sided change on the side of spectacular 
capitalism. Rather, it is an infinity of change on both the side of consciousness and the world. 
And it is this infinity that Hegel calls true or genuine infinity.  
True infinity taken thus generally as determinate being which is posited as 
affirmative in contrast to the abstract negation, is reality in a higher sense 
than the former reality which was simply determinate; for here it has 
acquired a concrete content.421 
One who glibly passes judgement experiences reality as determinate, but in so doing negates the 
work of consciousness, which consists in patiently tarrying with the actual issue.  
For instead of getting involved in the real issue, this kind of activity is 
always away beyond it; instead of tarrying with it, and losing itself in it, 
this kind of knowing is forever grasping at something new; it remains 
essentially preoccupied with itself instead of being preoccupied with the 
real issue and surrendering to it. To judge a thing that has substance and 
solid worth is quite easy, to comprehend it is much harder, and to blend 
judgment and comprehension in a definitive description is the hardest thing 
of all.422 
Such is the activity of the spectator watching history unfold; he is not a historical being 
participating in the concrete world.  
Change is not an autonomous, isolated self-movement. It begins with work, where 
consciousness and history mutually transform and relate to one another. Life then is no longer 
the realm of alienation and desire, the madness of fleeting moments. History is no longer a mere 
accident that happens to consciousness, and the relationships between consciousness and the 
world mere correlations. Who we are and the state of the world is the result of creative activity or 
work. With work, real change arises out of true infinity as real permanence.  
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Work, on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved 
off…The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something 
permanent.423 
This is the permanence of creation, as the self-creation of consciousness through its 
relations with others. It is work raised to the level of infinity as a lifelong activity—as the return 
of humans to their natural being as a social species.  
 This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as 
fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of 
the conflict between man and nature and between man and man…424  
And it is through this naturalism, work as natural activity, that we achieve permanence in the 
second sense—permanence as liberation and freedom or, for Marx, communism.  
…the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between 
objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, 
between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history 
solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.425 
 In the end, the solution to the riddle is always there, naturally within each and every 
individual. “Because this substantiality is immediate, it implies the aspect of naturalness, of 
organic vitality. To this extent the idea is the universal in the form of species.”426 Therefore, the 
most radical revolution is not a broad, spectacular sweep on the surface with the goal of a fresh 
start and beginning everything anew. Rather, it is to look at the foundation. The most radical task 
is rarely entertained because the solution is deep within us, something that we possess all along. 
Naturalism is neither the desire to return to a specific part of history—the good old days—nor a 
rejection of history itself as a return to pre-history. Naturalism means a return to a natural and 
communal way of living that we know is possible.  
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In a society increasingly based upon self-interest, how can anybody 
take ‘the standpoint of socialised humanity’? Somehow, amidst all the 
corruption and fragmentation of the modem world, we have remained – not 
much, not always, generally unknown to ourselves and with many mistakes 
and distortions – human. At the back of our minds, we still know it. 
If this were not the case, there could be no language, no science, no 
philosophy, no politics, no poetry, no love. These activities – twisted and 
perverted, organically entangled in their inhuman wrapping as they are – 
still do exist. That tells us that humanity does indeed survive, but bound up 
with, and hidden by, its direct opposite, in forms which simultaneously give 
us this message of humanity and deny it.427 
All it takes is patience to actualize this human potential. We do not need the added pressures of 
being new, innovative, and original. To do things differently does not require finding novel and 
ground breaking solutions. It involves understanding who we are and what we are doing. To 
focus on innovation only complicates matters. “At the very time when we need to speak as 
plainly as we can to each other and to ourselves, leading thinkers are determined to wrap their 
pronouncements in the most obscure language they can devise.”428 Innovations may be harmful 
not because they have no benefits but because they distract from and conceal the real issue.  
Technological innovation has a long history, and is an essential 
component of capitalist society, sometimes described as industrial or post-
industrial. But since its most recent acceleration (in the aftermath of the 
Second World War) it has greatly reinforced spectacular authority, by 
surrendering everybody to the mercy of specialists, to their calculations 
and to the judgments which always depend on them.429 
The Buddha’s teachings are valuable not necessarily because of their originality but their 
practicality.  
‘Excellent, Lord, excellent! It is as if someone were to set up what had been 
knocked down, or to point out the way to one who had got lost, or to bring 
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an oil-lamp into a dark place, so those with eyes could see what was 
there.430 
The lamp of enlightenment and the eyes to see have always been there. All we have to do is lift 
our eyes and walk forward, slowly but surely, towards the goal. The Buddha, like Laozi, Hegel, 
and Marx, are not asking us to attempt anything beyond our ability. They are not pointing to 
impossible problems that require impossible solutions.  
Is a free, united, self-governing association only possible for gods, as 
Rousseau thought? Is the task of emancipation too hard for mere mortals? 
Marx’s conception of history is the key to an answer to these questions: 
‘Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this 
solution.’ [2] Humans have themselves unconsciously made this inhuman 
world, and have now reached the stage where, on the basis of past 
conquests, they can and must consciously remake it. That is how freedom, 
which is the essence of humanity, emerges into the open and the nightmare 
of our prehistory gives way to our real, conscious, human history.431 
The path towards realization of our human potential is difficult but, once we acknowledge it, to 
be human is actually easier than we make it out to be. Teachers helping students, parents taking 
care of their children, friends being kind to friends, engagement in dialogue are some ways of 
realizing who we can be as humans. The most complicated problems may have simple solutions.  
In the universe the difficult things are done as if they are easy. 
In the universe great acts are made up of small deeds. 
The sage does not attempt anything very big, 
And thus achieved greatness.432 
 
The goal of emancipation is not something for consciousness to anxiously await. Looking 
ahead, the path is always long and difficult and it seems consciousness “is like a prisoner who 
laboriously files the bars of his window.”433 The real measure of progress is not how close we are 
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to the goal. The prisoner “is not free little by little; he is not free at all for some time.”434  It is 
only when he looks back that he can tell himself, “You have found yourself now; from the very 
beginning nothing has been hidden from you; it was yourself who shut your eyes to reality.”435 
The riddle of humanity that hung over us for so long and kept us bound in suffering evaporates 
instantaneously, as awareness “bursts forth like a volcanic eruption or explodes like a clap of 
thunder.”436 At this moment the condition of our inverted world heading towards self-destruction 
is itself inverted. This sudden liberation is not a spectacular escape which promises instant 
liberty at the price of infinite submission. The liberation of Nibbana, Absolute Knowing, 
Communism or the Tao can only arise out of infinite work which may bring unexpected 
emancipation. “At a single stroke I have completely crushed the cave of phantoms.”437 Thus 
Hegel says, “Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it 
what truly is,”438 but that end “presupposes…its beginning.”439 Emancipation ultimately is 
neither a looking ahead nor a looking behind. It is liberation at every single moment, the 
equanimous overcoming of suffering right where we are.  At the moment of realization, the end 
is the beginning, when one no longer clings to the past nor anxiously anticipates the future.  
“This is deliverance!”, and he knows: “Birth is finished, the holy life has 
been led, done is what had to be done, there is nothing further here.”440 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The title of the thesis is the Work of Emancipation and the Emancipation of Work; I 
chose work as the central topic of my paper is because of the ubiquity of the term. Regardless of 
our opinions on goodness, justice, beauty or the religious and philosophical beliefs that we hold, 
work, as we call it--employment or wage-labor—is an unquestioned reality for all of us. There is 
a reason for this. As Marx says in “Wage Labor and Capital,” the worker “works in order to 
live.”441 It is obvious that we work to make a living and a career is a crucial benchmark to be 
achieved. Work is an inevitable part of life. But even then we have not gotten to the real 
importance of work because to equate work with what we think of as employment is to see it 
merely as part of a checklist, a burden that limits us.  
But work is not limiting.  It is freeing and liberating. It is not the freedom of sellers and 
buyers in commodity exchange or the freedom of selling oneself on the market as a free-laborer 
for a wage. Rather, it is creative freedom. As Marx says in the Appendix of Capital Vol.1, “Work 
is the eternal natural condition of human existence. The process of labor is nothing but work 
itself, viewed at the moment of its creative activity.”442 This creative activity is free in the sense 
that, as workers, we are capable of conceiving the possibilities of how the world could be and 
actualizing those possibilities. The world that we create, in turn, defines who we are. That is the 
basis of work. However, in practice, we run into a contradiction.  
On the one hand, work can be seen as the activity of building a community or work as 
service. For Hegel, when work is considered as the discipline of service, we go beyond our “self-
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centered attitude” and through it we “extend to the known real world of existence.”443 With 
communal work, fundamentally, we understand that, “men not only act on nature but also on one 
another.”444  This is work understood positively or concretely. The goals of communal work are 
also positive and concrete. When building a community, we are not aiming for a utopia or a 
paradise on earth. What we are looking for is simply “the earnestness of life in its concrete 
richness” and “this leads the way to an experience of the real issue.”445 Concerns such as forming 
better relationships with people and nature, improved social conditions, etc. will be at the 
forefront of work and we can achieve those goals not because each of us is left alone of our own 
accord but because we work together in order to create a better world. Communal work is 
described in the Tao Te Ching, where the worker “never tries to store things. The more he does 
for others, the more he has. The more he gives to others, the greater is his abundance.”446 Since 
work is our natural condition, the task of bringing about a community does not belong only to 
politics, academics, or activists. It is the capacity of every single person while doing the best that 
they can to be kind, compassionate and, overall, more human to one another.  
But, on the other hand, work can be seen as an intensification of our alienated and 
isolated existence. As Marx says, “If the silk worm were to spin in order to continue its existence 
as a caterpillar, it would be a complete wage-worker.”447 However, we never escape the cocoon 
but the more we become immersed in alienated or wage-labor we only reinforce the cocoon that 
we have surrounded ourselves with. This cocoon comes in many different forms such as wages, 
commodities, representations and images. They grant us the illusion of living life while keeping 
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us from actually being part of it. We no longer find freedom and liberation in creative activities. 
In today’s world, “life begins…where this activity ceases.”448 Life is not about living, the world 
is not something we create, but it is something that is given. “The twelve hours’ labor…has no 
meaning for him [the worker] as weaving, spinning, drilling, etc., but as earnings, which bring 
him to the table, to the public house, into bed.”449 This creates a separation between us and the 
real source of our identity and individuality which is each other. Modern production is dedicated 
to maintaining this separation by strengthening the cocoon which culminates in what Debord 
calls the spectacle. "In all of its particular manifestations — news, propaganda, advertising, 
entertainment — the spectacle is the model of the prevailing way of life.”450 The world of the 
spectacle is the inverse or the upside-down world of community. “In a world that has really been 
turned upside down, the true is a moment of the false.”451 It is the world occupied not by actively 
living human beings but by passive and lifeless spectators.  
Between the two kinds of life, between the community and the spectacle, just by looking 
around us, we can tell that we have chosen the society of the spectacle as our universal reality. 
However, the possibility of a communal life still exists but, nonetheless, forgotten. With that in 
mind, before we can say with certainty that what we need is community, two questions need to 
be addressed. The first question is, why should we assume that communal life is better than 
spectacular life? It seems that we are doing fine and the world is better than ever before. While 
that may seem true, it is only because the spectacle specializes in appearances. “Considered in its 
own terms, the spectacle is an affirmation of appearances and an identification of all human 
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social life with appearances.” 452 The spectacle poses as the epitome and the end of history, as 
what human life is meant to be. It appears invulnerable and infallible, free from challenges and 
alternatives. “The spectacle is the ruling order’s nonstop discourse about itself, its never-ending 
monologue of self-praise, its self-portrait at the stage of totalitarian domination of all aspects of 
life.”453 Because of that the spectacle is able to conceal the fact that its nature is self-defeating. 
Unlike the community which is positive and concrete, the spectacle is always negative. The 
spectacle is on the side of abstraction, dissolution and self-destruction. Underneath the façade of 
stability and supremacy, the spectacle runs the risk of undermining its own existence. “The 
things the spectacle presents as eternal are based on change, and must change as their 
foundations change. The spectacle is totally dogmatic, yet it is incapable of arriving at any really 
solid dogma. Nothing stands still for it. This instability is the spectacle’s natural condition, but it 
is completely contrary to its natural inclination.”454 Overall, the inherent fragility and weakness 
of the spectacle reflects the fact that we, as the producer of the spectacle, are also, like moths to a 
flame, heading towards our own destruction the more we produce and reproduce the spectacle. 
“Workers do not produce themselves; they produce a power independent of themselves. 
The success of this production, the abundance it generates, is experienced by the producers as 
an abundance of dispossession. As their alienated products accumulate, all time and space 
become foreign to them.”455 As a result, “The spectator does not feel at home anywhere, because 
the spectacle is everywhere.”456 In other words, by remaining within the society of the spectacle, 
we deprive ourselves of our own being.  
                                                            
452 Ibid, Section 10.  
453 Ibid, Section 24. 
454 Ibid, Section 154.  
455 Ibid, Section 31. 
456 Ibid, Section 30. 
  135
If we were to acknowledge the self-destructiveness of the spectacular life, the next 
question then is how do we overcome the spectacle and reestablish communal life? Despite our 
effort of trying to break away from a counterfeit life, the main problem is we think that to 
overcome the spectacle is to be outside of it and in the process we think that community is 
something outside of us. Consequently, we either think that the communal life is but a dream, a 
result of wishful thinking and naïve optimism or we hold to the view that the notion of true 
community can only be understood and realized by a select few (Hegelians, Zen Buddhists, 
Marxists, etc.). With the latter approach instead of, as Hegel puts it, “looking the negative in the 
face, and tarrying with it,” 457 we find “find a way of creating an impression of hard work and 
serious commitment to the problem, while actually sparing [ourselves] both.”458 We want change 
by neglect what we are already doing and find a certain fixed ideology or cause we can identify 
ourselves with. Change begins right where we are, at every single living moment. It is not about 
bringing revolution into our life but seeing that life is already the foundation of revolution. 
Therefore, even a small act of humanity, such as making time to have a meaningful dialogue, is 
already a moment of non-spectacular relation and in that moment we are already free from the 
spectacle. It is a moment of reclaiming or, to be more accurate, of remembering, in place of 
forgetting, our natural communal being and actualizing it through patience and hard work.  
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